HIERARCHY AND DUALISM
IN ARISTOTELIAN PSYCHOLOGY

GERRIT GLAS

Philosophical anthropology and psychology have shown in recent years an increasing interest in human emotions and emotive life. In the light of a philosophical and cultural tradition of twenty-five centuries, which sought to define human nature without making any substantial reference, it seems, to feelings and emotions, this interest is remarkable indeed. The so-called Platonic-Christian tradition is mostly held responsible for this relative neglect of the emotional side of the human condition. Present-day writers often point in this connection to the hierarchical ordering of human functions or levels of being in the Greek and early Christian view of the human person. When theoretical or religious contemplation is taken to be the principal and highest objective of human life, human emotions and physical desires can only be considered as belonging to a lower order, as a disturbing and disruptive constituent of human life.

While this commonly held interpretation does raise a key problem of the ancient and patristic view of human nature and its emotional life—namely, its hierarchical framework—this interpretation, nevertheless, suffers, I feel, from one-sidedness. Plato, Aristotle and Augustine cannot simply be

---


2 The Latin Church Father Tertullian (ca 160–ca 230), however, gave an account which seems to confirm this common interpretation by identifying corporeality, disorder and irrationality with evil: 'It is the rational element (of the soul) which we must believe to be its natural condition, impressed upon it from its very first creation by its Author, who is Himself essentially rational... The irrational element, however, we must understand to have accrued later, as having proceeded from the instigation of the serpent... (De anima, ANCL, XV, pp. 442–3). Cited from Hillman, op. cit., p. 209.
assumed to have rejected emotional behaviour and the expression of feelings without further ado. Both Plato and Augustine, in fact, wrestled at great length with the problem of emotion in its widest sense. Platonic theoretical *eros* and Augustinian religious commitment cannot be regarded as detached and dispassioned human activities, and Aristotle gave us a rather detailed and balanced account of the whole scale of emotional phenomena in human beings. We shall deal with this account in this essay. Rather than disconnecting the bonds of emotion with moral behaviour, poetry and rhetoric, Aristotle sought to restore them.

There is still another reason for regarding this prevalent interpretation with a certain reservation. Contemporary thought has undergone the influence of Cartesian philosophy and our perception of the Greek view of the human person may well be coloured by this philosophy. Especially the concept of emotion has been affected by discussions of mind and body from a Cartesian point of view. The Greek concept of matter is, for example, easily mistaken for the Cartesian *res extensa*, thus rendering the ancient accounts of emotion as early and inadequate precursors of the modern physiological theories of emotion which bear the stamp of Descartes. The scope of modern physiology is, however, considerably narrower than its ancient counterpart: somatic treatment and moral dictates both belonged in equal measure to the ancient science of healing. In comparison to Descartes and his successors, the Greek concept of matter is much broader.

The Greeks, in turn, had really no concept for consciousness especially in its reflexive sense of self-consciousness. We are inclined to equate emotion with some kind of self-awareness. Introspection as one of the methods of examining emotions, shows some resemblance—albeit superficial—to Descartes' experiment that led him in the final analysis to the basic experience of consciousness as 'I think therefore I am.' The commonly accepted notion of emotion as primarily a subjective experience is, it seems, closely connected with the Cartesian concept of consciousness. Must we therefore conclude that the ancient philosophers could not but disregard emotionality altogether because they were unacquainted with such a concept of consciousness? A conclusion of this kind would betray, I believe, a Cartesian bias.

---


4 In (Neo-)Platonism, the concept of matter denotes that which is chaotic, formless, impure, evil, in general that which is devoid of being. In Aristotelianism, matter is synonymous with unqualified and undifferentiated potentiality, whereas the Cartesian *res extensa* refers to that which is visible, solid, impenetrable, infinitely divisible and external to the mind.

A careful study of the ancient theory of human emotion in the context of the ancient hierarchical models of man is required in order to avoid such a bias. In this essay I shall address myself to one main question: *Can a hierarchical ‘model’ of man do justice to human emotions?* I have chosen Aristotle as the representative of such a hierarchical view, because his oeuvre presents us with a rather detailed, although not entirely systematic account of the emotions. In my discussions of Aristotle, I shall for the purpose of comparison also draw on the dualist theory of Descartes. In the last section both theories will be examined side by side with the anthropology of Herman Dooyeweerd. This essay makes no claim to historical detail. It merely offers a systematic outline of one of the historical landmarks in the philosophical theory of emotions. My discussion will centre around two pairs of contrasts: namely, the rational and irrational and the passive and active.

1. Aristotle: General Background

Two problems face anyone who attempts to gain clear insight into Aristotle's psychology and particularly his view of emotions. First, the *corpus Aristotelicum* does not deal with emotions as a distinct subject matter. Aristotle's views on this subject are scattered throughout his works and are found in various contexts, as, for example, in a general theory of the soul (*De anima*) or in a discussion of ethical or rhetorical matters (*Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric*). It is therefore incorrect to speak of one Aristotelian theory of emotions; there are several and they must not be merged by extrapolating them out of their separate contexts.

Secondly, there is the moot question of development in Aristotelian thought, especially with regard to the presumably extensive lost works. Franciscus J.C.J. Nuyens distinguished three phases in Aristotle's thinking on the relationship between soul and body. The first is the early Platonic-dualist phase, followed by a transitional phase in which the body is viewed as a tool or instrument of the soul. The *Nicomachean Ethics* he considers to belong to this instrumental phase. The final phase is one in which Aristotle develops his mature doctrine of the substantial unity of body and soul, also designated as his doctrine of hylomorphism. It is found, for example, in *De anima.*

Charles Lefèvre, in a thorough analysis on this question of development, has

---

6 In this contribution I shall make use of two criteria of evaluation. First of all, a theory of emotion must account in one way or another for the fact that emotions are personal. They tell us something about a person. In the second place, I shall take the view that the different functions in human acting are morally and ontologically equivalent to each other. Other criteria which might be mentioned are of less relevance in the evaluation of hierarchical ‘models.’ The question whether Aristotle held a hierarchical or dualist view is discussed by H. Robinson, ‘Aristotelian Dualism,’ *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy I* (1983), pp. 123–144. M.C. Nussbaum has raised justifiable criticism in: ‘Aristotelian Dualism: A Reply to Howard Robinson,’ *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy II* (1984), pp. 197–207.

7 Diogenes Laërtius V, 45 makes mention of a treatise *Peri Pathoon,* which presumably belongs to the extensive lost works of Aristotle. I am grateful to A.P. Bos, who called my attention to this reference.


offered a critique of Nuyens' interpretation, especially of his distinguishing a separate middle phase.\footnote{10} Lefèvre denies the need of this distinction and shows that the works of this so-called instrumental period bear the marks of both dualism and hylomorphism. J. Verhaeghe, whose monograph deals with the concept of man in Aristotle's ethics, even goes so far as to question the importance of the genetic approach to the corpus.\footnote{11}

I shall concentrate on the works generally attributed to the later phases of Aristotle's thought, in particular to De anima, Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric and Politics. My starting point will be the hylomorphism of De anima, because here we find the hierarchical view of man and living nature in general. Whereas I agree with Lefèvre that an instrumentalist period cannot be distinguished from a hylomorphic period, there are differences in scope and tenor between De anima and works usually attributed to this so-called instrumentalist period, as Lefèvre has shown meticulously. I will first summarize Aristotle's views, leaving open the question whether or not these views can all be fitted into the general framework of hylomorphism. In the following sections I will return to this problem.

In De anima, the soul is equated with life in its most general sense, thus also the life of plants. Aristotle distinguishes between five levels of functioning in the living part of the cosmos: namely, the functions or faculties of nutrition (or growth), of sensation, striving, understanding and voluntary movement.\footnote{12} This very broad concept of soul, which encompasses life in all its variation, has been called the 'biological theory.'

This biological theory of the soul differs from the Platonic conception of the soul worked out in the relatively late dialogues, such as Philebus, Timaeus, and Laws. In the earlier dialogues, such as the Phaedo (66b–67c), Plato conceives of the passions as having a purely physical origin. As such they infect the immaterial soul. However, in the later dialogues such passions as anger and fear and even the bodily drives of hunger and thirst all have their seat in the soul. Plato locates the middle part of the soul, to which the passions belong, in the breast, and the lower part, containing the appetites, in the abdomen (Timaeus 69c–72d). The theme of pollution is also broached here, but Plato now thinks of it in terms of a struggle between the different parts of the soul: the lower parts infecting the higher, rational part of the soul.

In spite of this remarkable expansion of the concept of soul, the later Plato still differs in at least three respects from the doctrine of the substantial unity of soul and body, as developed in De anima. First, Plato speaks of 'parts' where Aristotle prefers to use the notion of 'faculties' of the soul.\footnote{13} Secondly, these faculties are hierarchically arranged in such a way that the higher levels govern the lower and that each lower level becomes integrated in the level above.\footnote{14} Thirdly, Aristotle regards the soul as the perfection of

\footnote{10} C. Lefèvre, Sur l'évolution d'Aristote en psychologie, Louvain: 1972, ch. 4, in particular pp. 214–250.
\footnote{11} J. Verhaeghe, Het mensbeeld in de aristotelische ethiek, Brussel, 1980, pp. 17–24.
\footnote{12} De anima, 414a 30–415a 14, 453a 9–455a 10.
\footnote{13} De anima 411b 26, 27; 432b 2, 3.
\footnote{14} De anima 413a–2b 25; 415a 1–12; 434a 23–b11. Aristotle, in fact, elaborated only very
the body. Corporality is conceived of as matter achieving its highest degree of actualization in the form, that is, the soul, as the first actuality, imprinting its entelechic force on the body.

Plato's and even less Aristotle's view of the soul can hardly be identified with the Cartesian notion of a thinking substance. The reduction of the concept of soul to purely mental acts, in the sense of Descartes, is entirely incompatible with the biological theory of Aristotle. Neither is it in line with the Stagirite to equate the soul with consciousness and to describe the activities of the soul as manifestations of mental processes, tempting as that may be. Aristotle is concerned with life in all its forms and not with consciousness as such.

The hylomorphism of *De anima* always refers to the formative power of life in relation to matter (or that which has the first potentiality). This fact may be illustrated by Aristotle's comments on emotions. It is practically inconceivable that any emotion be devoid of some physical response. He even states that from a physicist's point of view anger *is* the boiling of blood around the heart (403a 30–b 2). This statement seems to imply a blatant materialism. However, as Sorabji has pointed out, Aristotle never intended to state that anger is identical with the boiling of blood, or warm substance around the heart. His claim is not that anger is merely a physiological process.

Aristotle exemplifies his position by comparing anger with a house. The function of a house cannot be understood in terms of the nature of the bricks alone. Function and material are governed by their own principles. They are at the same time both necessary and interdependent. The bricks by themselves do not add up to a house; they may still be there when the house is demolished. The function or 'form' of the house, the reason for its having been constructed—as a shelter, for example—should, on the other hand, not be taken as one component among the other material components. The form determines the whole and arranges matter in a meaningful way. Aristotle does not contradict himself, therefore, when he states that anger has a corporeal basis (or 'is' corporeal) and that it is determined by a mental representation or desire, in case of anger, the craving for retaliation in the face of unwarranted insult (403a 25–b 17).

The doctrine of the substantial unity of body and soul, as the above example clearly shows, has important consequences for the theory of emotion. If the phenomena of life together constitute a whole, determined by both matter and form, then emotions cannot be adequately accounted for by separating them into mental and physical components, as Descartes does. Emotions are more than the sum total of physiological processes and purely

briefly on the hierarchical interlacements and confined his summary statements to the lowest levels/faculties.


16 Aristotle holds that it is not the soul which feels pity or becomes angry, but man by means of his soul: *De anima* 407b 12–16, 1035a 7–10.

17 *De anima* 403a 5–25, 407b 24, 408b 10 -15, 23–30.

mentals acts. Aristotle distinguishes these constituents not as separate components but as material and formal causes: the boiling of the blood around the heart is the material, the desire to retaliate the formal cause of anger.19

2. Aristotle on Emotion: Rational or Irrational?

Having sketched the basic tenets of Aristotle's theory of emotion, we are now able to focus on the two contrasts mentioned in the introduction. Are emotions to be regarded as rational or as irrational? With regard to this first contrast, the Stagirite discusses at some length the role of mental representation (or the mental object) in emotion. In doing so, he takes up a train of thought which can be traced back to the *Philebus* of Plato. In this dialogue, however, the role of mental representation is far from clear; it seems to be accidental in respect of the other aspects of emotion (37e–38b). Plato leaves, for example, the question concerning the kind of relation that exists between the physical sensations and the mental representations unanswered.

Turning now to the other works of Aristotle in which he deals with emotion, the *Rhetoric* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, these go roughly two steps beyond the position of the *Philebus*. First, the mental representation is taken to be an indispensable element in the concept of (almost every) emotion. Second, particularly the *Rhetoric* postulates a kind of causal connection between the representation and the other aspects of emotion. The mental element is the efficient cause of the corresponding sensations. Thus, anger is defined as the desire for revenge, accompanied by the pain which follows an apparent and unjustified insult to oneself or to what belongs to one.20 The awareness of being humiliated is the cause of becoming angry, just as the thought of imminent danger is the efficient cause of fear (1382a 21–30). Moreover, as in *De anima*, Aristotle also discerns a material and final cause. A person's state, especially his physical state, constitutes the material cause, while the object of desire or the end of an action, incited by a particular emotion is the final cause. As an example of the first, the *Rhetoric* discusses the influence of age on a person's emotional life. Old age is said to dispose to cowardice because of the reduced body temperature (1389b 29). It also briefly gives an instance of the second: a faint expectation of escape. To fear means to doubt the possibility of self-defence; it does not mean the conviction that no defence is possible.21

It comes as no surprise that in the context of rhetorics the cognitive aspect turns out to be predominant in the definition of emotion. In order to persuade his audience the rhetorician seeks to engender the proper

19 *De anima* 402b 28–403a 17 discerns three perspectives, the perspective of the physicist studying the material, the technician investigating the composite (sunolon) of form and matter, and the mathematician/philosopher delineating the form.
21 This example illustrates the complexity of emotional phenomena. This complexity sometimes resists any attempt to fit these phenomena into a conceptual scheme. Fear does not, it seems, refer to a final goal in its extreme form, because in a situation of complete helplessness there is no future goal. The very impediments to attaining the goal (to be rescued) seem to play a 'causal' role in the genesis of fear, but these impediments do not amount to complete helplessness. In a completely helpless situation there is no fear but only apathy.
emotional state through the application and contrivance of cognitions, which constitute the gateway to the corresponding emotions. To do so, he must have knowledge of the situations, the circumstances and conditions which correspond with the cognitive contents of emotions and which facilitate their occurrence. Perhaps the emphasis on the cognitive aspect is less absolute than it appears and must be understood in the perspective of rhetorics as the art of verbal persuasion. Aristotle’s account of emotions would indeed not have been as detailed, if he had not believed that this cognitive element were a constituent of emotions, being even capable of engendering them, but there is no ground for claiming that the Rhetoric represents ‘the cognitive view of emotion.’ This work, as we have seen, does not neglect the bodily dispositions and their influence on human emotions.

In the Nicomachean Ethics a new dimension is added to what I have called the cognitive element of emotion: namely, the doctrine of the bipartite nature of the human soul. This bipartition concerns the distinction between the logical (or rational) and a-logical (or non-rational) half or element of the human soul. The former refers to man’s capacity to reason and deliberate; the latter to his capacity to respond to and obey the directives issuing from the rational principle. Aristotle likens this obedience to the attitude of a child to its father. The virtues are also distinguished in accordance with this bipartition. Thus, theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom, corresponding with the rational element, are called ‘intellectual virtues’; character traits or dispositions such as temperance and liberality, corresponding with the non-rational element, are called ‘moral’ (1102a 24–1103a 10). The latter are closely connected with the affects of the soul.

However, affects, or passions, are not the same as moral virtues. A person is not called good or bad on the basis of his passions, but on the basis of his virtues or vices. Virtues are a matter of choice; passions, such as anger and fear occur without choice. Choice is an essential element in the concept of moral virtue. When we experience the passions, we are said to undergo change. Aristotle summarizes his position when he says that moral virtues are bhexeis of the soul. We are well or ill disposed to the passions (pathé) in accordance with a hexis, meaning a disposition, a formed habit, a state of character. Thus, temperance, for example, may be seen as being well disposed with respect to anger and fear. To complete the picture, Aristotle also distinguishes several faculties (dunameis) of the soul. A dunamis, such as the capacity to be angry, should also not be confused with the moral virtues, since it belongs to our nature and hence we cannot be praised or blamed on account of it.23

23 Nicomachean Ethics 1105b 19–1106a. In the translation of D. Ross (revised by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson 1923; 1980) this passage reads: ‘By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general feelings that are accompanied by pleasure and pain; by faculties (dunameis) the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character (bhexeis) the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if
This piling up of distinctions may, at first sight, seem rather confusing, but we must realize that Aristotle's primary interest in this work is practical: the upbringing of children and the ethical preliminaries with regard to political activity. Restricting ourselves to the first, the various distinctions contribute to a rather detailed and realistic picture of education. Although children possess numerous capacities (dunameis), Aristotle states, they lack as yet any rational activity. They come into the world without habits (bhexets), but are susceptible to the various affects (pathe) of the soul. These passions must be moulded and regulated by the educators, if children are to develop into virtuous persons. This moulding strives after stability with regard to the passions in all kinds of situations, so that its process is complete when it has resulted in more or less fixed patterns of behaviour, in habits or character traits called moral virtues. Aristotle stresses that the moral virtues are acquired through the repetition of the corresponding acts. The virtue of temperance is acquired through temperate acts. In most cases, such acts are initially realized through some degree of coercion, through punishment, for example.24

However, the foregoing only represents a part of Aristotle's view on education. Interesting is Aristotle's suggestion that once the child has grown up and the rational part has become active, passions may serve as an indication of the choice that a person must make for what he calls the 'mean' or 'intermediate' (meson). Thus, virtue is defined as 'a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. in the mean relative to us...' (1106b 36–1107a 1). The mean avoids both excess and defect in action as well as passion. Determining the mean at the end of book two of the Nicomachean Ethics thus, Aristotle adds that it is grasped by perception rather than (primarily) by reason. Finding the mean is like the act of straightening a warped piece of wood: we have to drag ourselves away from the extreme to which our nature tends towards the opposite extreme. The position in which we find ourselves between the two extremes is to be recognized by the pleasure or pain which we feel with regard to them.25 The passions therefore not only are influenced by the habits which we acquire; they also serve to provide us with signals as to the acceptable behaviour and the moral attitudes. According to this work then, these signals occur on the level of sense perception. In contemporary terms, we might call a passion a kind of pre-reflexive awareness, combined with a tendency toward action in one direction or another.

Our discussion of Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics centered around the contrast between the rational and the irrational. With regard to this contrast we can conclude that the Stagirite locates emotion in the non-rational or

---

24 In the quoted passages, Aristotle makes use of a medical analogy. Punishment is a kind of cure; it belongs to the nature of cures to be effected by contraries (1104b 11). As private education has an advantage over public education so also private medical treatment is to be preferred to public (1180b 8).

25 This signalling function of emotion does not take away the important role of practical wisdom, which in the first place is concerned with the choice of the right means, but is also (just as emotion/moral virtue) involved in the choice of the moral end of one's actions (Book III, 4 and book VI, 12, 13).
HIERARCHY AND DUALISM

103

alogical part of the soul along with the moral virtues. This location does not imply that human emotions are devoid of meaning or even that they are to be equated with the blind habits or disruptive impulses of animal behaviour. Aristotle is arguing within the framework of bipartition of the soul, which is an exclusively human model of the soul.26 Although the non-rational half of the human soul is of itself incapable of reasoning and deliberating, it is receptive to the guidance of the logos and can obey its rules. Moreover, our discussion of the relation between moral virtue and passion has shown that pleasure and pain sometimes obtain an important evaluative and signalling function in the acquisition of the right moral attitude. Hence, we may conclude that human emotions are more than mere (animal) reflexes. Although they are not instances of logical calculation,27 they are still marked by a kind of discriminative awareness which might be described as the non-reflective evaluation of situations, accompanied by a tendency to move from or towards something. This tendency is then determined by the emotion in question.

Because human emotions are receptive to the guidance of reason, Aristotle is able to explain the effects of verbal persuasion partly in terms of bringing about the right emotional state in the audience. The mental images which the speaker elicits through his rhetorical art is the efficient cause of the corresponding emotions. This manner of bringing about an emotional state is the not only one; other means can be applied to influence the course and intensity of emotional life.28 Education appears to be the most decisive.29 Here, too, the argument runs parallel. The external coercion, which is often needed, does not necessarily lead to the formation of a set of blind habits. Most people, of course, have natural and acquired inclinations and attitudes which are more or less rigid, but which take on a new shape in every new situation by a kind of dialogue between moral virtue, practical wisdom (which belongs to the rational 'half') and emotional responses.30

Our discussion raises some fundamental questions which remain to be answered. Does not the doctrine of the bipartite soul contradict, or at least

26 This point is stressed by W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion. A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics and Ethics, London: Duckworth, 1975, ch. 2, for example, p. 23: 'Once emotions were focussed upon and recognized as a special class of cognitive phenomena open to reasoned persuasion in a way that bodily drives are not, it was possible to develop a peculiarly human psychology which could replace Plato's tripartite psychology.' In my view, Fortenbaugh goes too far in his emphasis on the cognitive status of emotions.

27 Corresponding remarks are made about smell, De anima 424b 3–18.


29 Education is not restricted to intellectual learning, but involves exercise and training. Courage is not a result of talking about it. The quality of one's emotional and moral responses is evidenced in unexpected situations, which do not permit rational deliberation. Cf. W.W. Fortenbaugh, op. cit., pp. 70–75, on 'sudden alarm.'

30 Nicomachean Ethics 1143b 18–1145a 11. Practical wisdom (phronēsis) is compared to the eye, which makes it possible for the body, which without sight might stumble, to walk straight. Cf. also 1178a 7ff.
disagree with, the theory of hylomorphism as presented in *De anima*. Does not this bipartition represent a relapse into the dualist division of the soul into two ‘parts’? Moreover, do not the nutritive and sensitive faculties of the soul fall outside the scope of the bipartite soul? With regard to this last question, Fortenbaugh has suggested that the bipartite model should be viewed exclusively as a cognitive theory in which, for example, considerations of the appetites as originating within the body have no place. He strictly separates the cognitive psychology of the *Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric* and *Politics* from the biological theory of *De anima*. This interpretation meets serious difficulties in the crucial passage of *Nicomachean Ethics* 1102a 25–1103a 3, in which Aristotle makes explicit mention of the appetites when he describes the non-rational part of the soul. Elsewhere in the same treatise (1178a 15) he even suggests that moral virtue may have a physical origin. Moreover, Fortenbaugh remains rather vague in delineating the meaning of the adjective ‘cognitive.’ He does not discuss the role of sense-perception and the importance of imagination for emotions. Cognition appears to be a narrower concept lying somewhere between a proposition and a belief.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the bipartite psychology of the *Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric* and *Politics* comes fairly close to an instrumentalist conception of the relationship between body and soul, in that the bipartite human soul, although closely connected with the body, is depicted as a unity in itself, i.e., a unity consisting of two parts. The question is raised again, therefore, as to whether or not a gap exists between the instrumentalist claim of bipartition and the integrative view of hylomorphism. I realize that a conclusive and comprehensive answer to this question exceeds the scope of the present discussion, but Lefèvre gives us solid support in his detailed and scholarly treatise on Aristotelian psychology. I shall sum up the

31 Fortenbaugh mentions, in summary, the following arguments: a) adherents to the idea of the compatibility of the biological with the political-ethical (cognitive) theory, wrongly assume that the alogical part of Aristotle’s psychology has issued from joining the two lower parts of Plato’s tripartite psychology, i.e. the affective and the appetitive parts (*thumoeides* and *epithumetikon*, respectively); Plato tied the *epithumetikon* more strongly to bodily drives than Aristotle; whereas Plato discerns a desiderative element in each of the three soul-parts, Aristotle groups all desiderative capacities together, including rational volition (*boulêsis*), in the alogical part of the soul (p. 31–35), b) the biological theory cannot ‘locate’ emotion, because emotions involve aspects of the *nous, orexis* and *aisthetikos* (p. 27, n. 1); c) biological and bipartite/ cognitive theory both presuppose entirely different frameworks, the biological theory being directed towards living nature in general and bipartite psychology exclusively to man. Fortenbaugh has been criticized by A.C. Lloyd, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 58(1976), pp. 268–271. Cf. also P.A. Vander Waerdt, *The peripatetic interpretation of Plato’s tripartite psychology*, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 26(1985), pp. 283–302.

32 In 1097b 33–1098a 3, both the biological theory and the bipartite psychology are brought together. Indeed, this passage makes clear that the bipartite model refers exclusively to human psychology. Aristotle suggests, however, that the biological theory refers to *functions* (or ontological structures) and bipartite psychology to *functioning* (moral acting); cf. 1098a 3–17. If this interpretation is valid, then the one viewpoint does not exclude the other, as Fortenbaugh seems to suggest.


34 *Politics* 1353a 16ff., 1354b 6–28. *Protrepticus* fragment 11 also refers to bipartition.

35 C. Lefèvre, *Sur l’évolution d’Aristote en psychologie*. This book also offers a scholarly criticism of the monumental commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics* by Gauthier and Jolif.
main conclusions of his study insofar as these are relevant in the present discussion, leaving aside the close argumentation of his investigations for the sake of brevity.

In the first place, both conceptions, that of instrumentalism as well as that of the soul's bipartition, can be found in the early works (such as Protrepticus) and in the later works (such as De anima). There is consequently no reason for postulating a distinct, instrumentalist middle-phase. Even De anima does not on closer inspection appear to be entirely consistent in its doctrine of hylomorphism. In the second place, hylomorphism is not really absent in the other works. It seems to be rather presupposed in them. In the discussion with Fortenbaugh this came out with regard to the Nicomachean Ethics Book I, cap. 7 and 13. In the third place, the ethical (and political) works admittedly offer a more restricted and rougher model of the soul compared to De anima, but the lack of psychological detail in them is due to the simply fact that their subject matter is different. Aristotle has no need of more refinement with regard to ethics and politics, so that, according to Lefèvre, these different perspectives should be explained in terms of Aristotle's different pedagogical aims. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, in spite of their difference in emphasis and structure.

In conclusion, De anima offers a general background by showing that man is a living creature among other living creatures (plants and animals). Whether or not it is wholly consistent in fulfilling the aim of providing a general and comprehensive theory of the hierarchically ordered, living cosmos, remains a moot question. The ethical, political and rhetorical works restrict themselves to man as an ethical, political and social being. They deal with human psychology only to the extent that it is relevant to the subject at hand.

As was indicated above, the bipartition conception only holds for the human soul; Aristotle never lost sight of the exceptional position of man in the earthly cosmos. It is worth adding that this point of view, as I will show at the end of this paper, is found in a more pronounced form in De anima, in the passage on the separate intellectual soul (429a 10–29, 430a 10–25).

3. Aristotle on Emotion: Passive or Active?

Some of the material relevant for the question which must now be raised—are emotions passive or active?—has been presented in the discussion

---

36 De anima 415b 20 calls 'natural bodies, plants as well as animals, organs of the soul.' Cf. the much discussed reference to Plato, 413a 8–9.

37 C. Lefèvre, Sur l'évolution, pp. 221–234, 281–287. He opts for "une conciliation 'pedagogique'" (p. 230ff.). Leighton, op. cit., draws a similar conclusion with regard to the different definitions of pathē in Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics and De anima.

38 Ibidem, pp. 235–242. Concerning 1178a 19–22: "Being connected with the passions also, the moral virtues must belong to our composite nature; and the virtues of our composite nature are human; ... The excellence of the reason is a thing apart..." (translation of Ross), Lefèvre remarks: "Mais, aux tenants d'une concordance avec le De anima, nous devons faire remarquer qu'il paraît impossible de comprendre le texte comme s'il y avait nous chooristos: c'est le bonheur de l'esprit ... qui est dit 'séparé', c'est à dire ... caractérisé par une réelle autonomie" (p. 240). In other words, this passage refers to the moral excellence of human reason, not to the separate intellect (nous chooristos) of De anima.
above. Before dealing with this question directly, however, we must keep in
mind that the metaphysical concept of ‘pathē’ is much broader than the
concept of ‘pathē of the soul,’ and that the latter is broader than the concept
of emotion. Pathē, in general, are related to the changes which happen to a
thing and which have an external cause. They are accidental to a thing and as
such stand in contrast to a thing's nature or essence, which is its principle of
motion. Strictly speaking, they do not bring about a modification of the
substances of things. Pathē may, however, interrupt the activity of a thing.
Their impact may also lead to the formation of dispositions, which influence
the course of particular activities. Inversely, the consequences of an agent's
activity sometimes ‘affect’ that agent, be it a person or a thing. However,
these refinements do not alter the basic principle: the essence of a thing is its
(natural) activity which cannot be affected by accidental and external circum-
stances (pathē), not even when they bring about permanent change.

Generally speaking, Aristotle maintains this position in his anthropology and
psychology. Discussing the nature and essence of the human being, he
invariably points to the intellect (nous poietikos), that is, the pure activity of
contemplation. Pure intellect does not contain anything of the body; it is
insensible to affections and impressions, it is unmixed, that is, it knows only
itself. In this way, the pure intellect (nous or nous poietikos) is separated in
some sense from the human soul (psyche). At some places this separation is
masked by conceiving both as parts of an encompassing soul. However,
even there Aristotle remains constant in his assumption that there is a part of
the soul which remains untouched by sensory impressions and other bodily
influences.

This metaphysical doctrine of the intellectus agens might lead one to
suspect that emotions are to be described as states of mind which are merely
passive, accidental and aroused by some external cause. However, they are
nothing of the kind. We encounter in Aristotelian psychology the remark-
able state of affairs that the pathē of the soul are enlisted in the striving after
the moral good and that they posses as such the element of intentional
action. As the preceding discussion of moral virtues demonstrated, passions
are included in the full description of man’s virtuous activities. When pro-
perly channelled, they provide the basis for a life of happy contemplation.
There seems to be, therefore, a disparity between the general view of pathē

Oksenberg Rorty, ‘Aristotle on the metaphysical status of pathē,’ Review of Metaphysics
40 Metaphysics 1075b 21 24, De anima 429a 15, 19, 24–29; 429b 5, 430a 16–18, 22–25, 430b
24, 25; Nicomachean Ethics bk. X, ch. 7, 8.
41 De anima 431a 16, 432a 7–14. For an adequate account of the difference between nous
and psyche, the theme of cosmos and microcosmos must be taken into consideration.
Presumably Aristotle assumed the existence of a fifth element (quinta natura, i.e., ether)
as the substance of the soul. The active intellect, then, should be conceived as the
immaterial centre of a surrounding nebula (ether), analogous to the earth and the heavenly
bodies. Cf. C. Lefèvre, ‘Quinta natura et psychologie aristotélienne,’ Revue de philos-
sophie de Louvain 69(1971), 5–43; A.P. Bos, ‘Aristotle’s Eudemus and Protrepticus: are they
really two different works?’ Dionysos, 3(1984), 19–51; A.P. Bos, ‘Aristotle on myth and
as being accidental and prompted by some external cause, on the one hand, and \textit{pathe} of the soul as being incorporated in an intentional action, on the other hand.

This disparity, however, is more apparent than real when it is approached from another point of view. Aristotle wants to safeguard above all the separateness of that which he considers to be the essence of man, namely: his intellect. Given the separateness of the \textit{nous} and making the transition to the theory of the mixed soul, it turns out that there is scope for connecting \textit{pathe} with action. This would obviously not be the case if \textit{nous} and \textit{psyche} were more closely tied together. When Aristotle argues for the separateness of the \textit{nous}, he seems to imply that, no matter how strong the impact of the emotions on man's soul (\textit{psyche}), they would not alter the inner nature and ultimate destiny of man, which goes far beyond the life of the mixed soul.\footnote{Lefèvre also calls it a paradox: the integrative tendency of hylomorphism, with its teleological-hierarchical order, conjures up its échec, the problem of the separate intellect (\textit{Sur l'évolution}, p. 287).}

According to this interpretation, it is the chasm between \textit{nous} and \textit{psyche} which is responsible for the disparity between metaphysical and psychological \textit{pathe}. And paradoxically, it is this tendency to metaphysical dualism which guarantees the unification of concepts in psychology.

Aside from these theoretical concerns, Aristotle also offers more practical reasons for emphasizing the strong connection between emotion and moral responsibility. Passions by themselves do not involve choice, but Aristotle seems to suggest that it is somewhat artificial to speak of passions by themselves. They often are part of an intentional act. For example, when someone revenges himself, the feeling of anger accompanies, intensifies, or perhaps even gives rise to the act of revenge. Or, to use another example, habits are acquired through the encouragement and punishment of an external, authoritative agent. We learn to be steadfast in frightening circumstances withou the losing sight of the inherent risks. Habits regulate passions as well as actions.\footnote{\textit{Nicomachean Ethics} 1106b 14–27.}

As we have observed, passions may in turn influence the choice and direction of one's moral actions. The strong connections between moral virtue and passion thus show how activity and passivity are intertwined.

Perhaps a further step may be made by suggesting that in the Aristotelian ethics the merely passive qualities of the passions are to be conquered by some kind of active principle. This active principle is embodied in good habits (the moral virtues) which are moulded by external rational control, in the first place, and are then in the second place internalized. It is the faculty of practical reasoning which in the final analysis leads to the perfection of both moral virtue and passion and commonly guides our action.\footnote{Besides the fact that practical reason belongs to the logical 'part' of the bipartite soul and moral virtue to the alogical 'part', there is another difference between these two. Moral virtues ensures a correct goal, whilst practical reason is responsible for proper means-end deliberations. In the mean time, although most of the emotions are, in some way, 'practical' in the sense of involving a possible goal for one's actions, there are some non-practical emotions, such as shame, indignation and pity. Cf. Fortenbaugh, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 81–83, who also suggests that the orientation of emotions to practical goals might explain why the Greeks knew no moral virtue corresponding to the Christian view of mercy. Viewed}
within the framework of Aristotelian ethics, therefore, it would be fruitless to attempt to isolate passions from the context of action within which they occur.

The definition of emotions in the *Rhetoric* confirms this contextuality. One of the elements in the definition there appears to be the final cause of an emotion. This finality means the drive towards some end: as, for example, in anger someone feels the desire to revenge oneself for the insult suffered (1378a, b). Aristotle goes even further when he adds that, since desires by their very nature are such that they aim at pleasure, the anticipated act of revenge must be within reach. How else could we expect a feeling of satisfaction if the anticipated end of our action would be beyond our reach? Hence, the tendency to act towards a particular goal must at the very least be enclosed in the definition of emotion and this enclosure, in turn, shows how closely activity and passivity are intertwined with regard to emotions.

Incidentally, analogous arguments for this fusing of activity and passivity may be found. For example, in *De anima* it is said of sense-perception (*aisthēsis*) that it is both *kinesisbai* (being moved), *paschein* (being acted upon) and *energein* (acting). Sense-perception, such as seeing, involves change but is more than just ‘being affected’ by something. In the act of seeing potentiality becomes actuality—the changed eye-stuff is transformed into an (active) sense-organ.45

In summary, *pathē* are, according to the general, metaphysical conception, accidental and exogenous; according to the psychological conception, however, they are assimilated in man’s intentional activities, whether they are conceived of as emotions or, in a wider sense, as ‘affections.’ This puzzling disparity may be clarified,

1) by pointing out that the separate *nous* has a particular status with regard to the composite soul; and
2) by emphasizing the practical aims of Aristotelian ethics and rhetorics. The treatises on these subjects suggest that in relation to moral activity and social life, it is neither realistic nor fruitful to distinguish sharply between passive states and purposeful acts.

Finally, with regard to *pathē* in the more restricted sense of emotion, the interaction of activity and passivity finds confirmation in the close connection between *pathē* and *orexis* (striving). The final paragraphs of the third chapter of *De anima* gives a detailed account of the soul as ‘being-in-movement.’ There are two principles of movement which belong to the soul itself, namely: *orexis* and *nous* combined with imagination. A certain order may be discernible here: appetites strive after a particular end and this end, in turn, forms the starting point of practical deliberation. The capacity to

---

45 *De anima* 416b 32–35, 417a 15–418a 7, 424b 2–19.
47 *De anima* 433a 9–20. The soul as form of the body, i.e., as that after which the body strives. As a principle of teleology, the soul is characterized in three ways in relation to movement: it is the principle of movement, the end of movement and also the cause or substantial form of animated bodies (415b 10ff., b 21, 22).
48 Practical deliberation, as will be remembered (see note 44), seeks for the means to a particular end, as is stated in *Nicomachean Ethics* Bk. VI, ch. 12, 13.
press towards a goal seems to be fundamental in relation to movement.\textsuperscript{49} There is a striving element in every part of the soul (432b 7). What appears to be relevant to the subject at hand is that striving is closely connected with the appetites, some of which originate in the body (432b 29–433a 3, 435b 5–13, 434a 13–16). The bodily 'component' may even be decisive as far as the fulfillment of desire in action may be concerned (432b 31–433a 2). It goes without saying that emotions are closely tied up with appetites, corporeal or otherwise. The \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} (1045b 20ff.) refers to 'appetites ... and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain' as examples of passions. Appetite is clearly included in the definition of passion here. \textit{De anima}, of course, also prescribes that the sensitive appetites ought to be controlled by rational volition (practical reason) but this does not preclude the appetites from being tied up with one of the two principles of movement of the soul, namely: \textit{orexis}. When the latter is considered to be one of the origins of the soul's motion and action, and when emotion is associated with \textit{orexis}, then there is no reason for regarding the emotions as accidental and exogenous changes, not affecting the essence of the soul, human or otherwise.\textsuperscript{50}

4. \textit{Aristotle's Account of Emotion: an Evaluation}

Going back over Aristotle's contribution to a philosophical theory of emotion, we face ambiguities on several points. First, he seems, on the one hand, to consider emotions to be truly human phenomena, enlisted in the striving for the moral good. On the other hand, emotions take no part in the excellence of the human being; at most they prepare the human person for the blessed life of contemplation. Secondly, if we begin with the hierarchical view of \textit{De anima} we would expect Aristotle to attempt to 'locate' the several aspects of emotions—the corporeal, the cognitive and the conative—on the corresponding levels of functioning. But in this work as well as in others, the intertwinenent and interaction of the different levels of the hierarchical order of faculties are hardly discussed.

This lack of structural intertwinenent can also be illustrated from another perspective. A comparison between human and animal emotional life would have been consistent with the doctrine of the soul in terms of hylomorphism. Human emotions are open to and guided by (rational) habits and practical reason, while animal emotions are not. This openness and guidance explains the difference between the two. While animals may be said to 'learn' from experience, they lack rational control. With regard to the corporeal and, to a certain extent, the conative aspects of emotion, man and animals show notable resemblances. Aristotle, however, hardly touches on this subject. Hence, it seems, hylomorphism serves only as a rough and ready means

\textsuperscript{49} The formulations are not, at first sight, completely compatible; 433a 22 mentions 'the desirable object' and 433a 32 points to the striving capacity as the 'cause' of movement. Cf. 433b 11ff., however, where Aristotle distinguishes between a) the principle of movement (consisting, in its turn, of an unmoved and a self-moved mover, i.e., the practical and striving capacities respectively), b) the organ of movement and c) that which is moved.

\textsuperscript{50} Cf. \textit{De anima} 408b 1–32. On the peculiar status of the \textit{nous} in this context, see 408a 16, 17.
of classifying plants, (higher and lower) animals and man. But the different phenomena which pertain to each of these in their respective ways are not distinguished.

Still, if one were to think a little further along these lines, one might well argue that even when the capacity to think is poorly developed in some people, as Aristotle, for example, supposes in the case of slaves and barbarians, one would still have to maintain a distinct difference between the emotions of such people and the emotions of animals. The difference may well be accurately formulated by saying that man is capable of acting, animals merely of reacting. However, Aristotle fails to draw this conclusion explicitly. This failure points to a fundamental problem in any theory of emotion and in Aristotle's hylomorphistic theory in particular: namely, to what extent does the theory of emotion, be it hierarchical or otherwise, account for the fact that human emotions reflect in one way or another the unique personality of an individual? Or, when the assumption of the personal character of (human) emotion is rejected, how can a split between the human and non-human 'parts' or functions of the human soul be avoided. In the case of Aristotle, such a split inevitably threatens the very unitary character of his (psychological) doctrine of the soul.

Restricting myself to Aristotle, I believe there are two main reasons that explain the presence of ambiguities in his view of emotion. One is that he failed to carry the program of hylomorphism through with sufficient consistency to avoid them. By hylomorphism I mean the hierarchical ordering of the soul's faculties of functions, instead of an ordering of 'substances' or 'parts.' Above we saw that very little attention is paid to the intertwinement and interaction of the various levels; each level seems to possess a relative independency with respect to the other levels. Sometimes the different levels appear to be substantialized, at least, to a certain degree. This particular lack of consistency is confirmed by the (well-nigh) separate existence of the (contemplative) nous. The conception of nous as pure activity, detached from bodily influences and sensory impressions, cannot be adequately accounted for within the framework of hylomorphism.

The second reason that may explain the presence of ambiguities in Aristotle's theory of emotion concerns the problem of the one and the many, a problem common to every hierarchical theory. Is the unity to which the many levels or functions refer outside of the hierarchical order or within it as one of the higher or lower functions or levels? In my estimation elements of both sides can be found in Aristotle's anthropology. If the unity is found outside of the hierarchical order, then the question arises: can hylomorphism still be considered the encompassing theory for the living cosmos, as Aristotle intended it to be? His conception of the nous, standing, as it were, with one leg outside of the hylomorphic framework, and, at the same time, serving as a point of reference, raises the same problem. Suppose that the nous is the principle of unity which the defines the essence of human nature: in which way are the distinct levels of functioning connected

---

51 This substantialization is apparent, for example, in those passages of De anima with instrumental overtones; cf. note 36.
with this unifying (and we may add: humanizing) principle? I touched on this question when discussing human and animal emotion. Aristotle fails to clarify the difference and he does not make clear why a person’s emotions tell us something about that person.

However, traces of the second solution can also be found. The principle of unity is then identified with one of the levels of functioning. Here again it is the *nous* which fills the bill. It is now conceived of as the highest level of functioning, and as such it is placed in within the framework of hylomorphism in which it serves as a point of reference. This solution, however, implies a scheme of higher and lower functions, in such a way that ‘higher’ means ‘more human’ and ‘lower’ means ‘less human.’ Aristotle’s view of slaves, barbarians and women as being ruled by the passions betrays this perspective.

Especially the double role of the *nous* must be considered as the source of the ambiguities in Aristotle’s theory of emotions. On the one hand, the activity of the *nous* is separated almost entirely from the activities of the *psychē*. The exclusive position of the *intellectus agens* threatens the unitary character of hylomorphism. On the other hand, when the *nous* is taken as the highest function of the *psychē* and as a point of reference for the other psychic functions, it results in a scheme of higher and lower functions which has somewhat elitarian implications.

Nevertheless, Aristotle does seem to have a clear sense of the connection between the idea of personal awareness and the problem of the one and the many. In the discussion of sense-experience in *De anima*, he raises two questions: first, does each of the different senses (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching) have the capacity to be aware that it is sensing separately, or is this capacity something that is common to all the senses together? Secondly, how is the capacity to differentiate between the distinct kinds of sensations to be accounted for? When an object is seen and heard at the same time, the sensation of seeing can be distinguished from the sensation of hearing (426b 12–427a 14). Comparing this passage of *De anima* with the discussion of the same subject in *Parva naturalia*, there is only one possible conclusion, and that is that Aristotle distinguished a common sense-organ (known in scholastic philosophy as *sensus communis*) which accompanies the functioning of all the five senses. Careful study reveals that the meaning of this concept of a common sense-organ (or perception proper) comes close to the modern notion of consciousness, at least taken in an elementary, non-reflective manner. This immediate (self-)awareness fades away during sleep.

---

52 This natural superiority of reason and intellect is also defended from the viewpoint of bipartition. Cf. *Politics*, VII, 14, 15.

53 Cf. *Parva naturalia* 449a 5–20; 455a 12ff.: “Each sense possesses something which is special and which is common. Special to vision, for example, is seeing, special to the auditory sense is hearing, and similarly to each of the others; but there is also a common power which accompanies them all, in virtue of which one perceives, that one is seeing and hearing ...” This central faculty with its functions of recognition and discrimination, also serves perhaps as an organ of ‘internal sense.’ The treatise *On memory* mentions three functions: the sense of time, the faculty of image-formation, and memory. Cf. Kahn, *op. cit.*, p. 14, 15. Kahn maintains that Aristotle’s *sensus communis* differs considerably from Cartesian consciousness (cf. note 5). His main arguments are that ‘perception
Aristotle states that the perception of differences between the distinctive sense-organs cannot be explained from the fact that 'I hear' and at the same time someone else sees. To distinguish them, both kinds of sensation must be present in one faculty of awareness. In this way, the five distinctive sense-organs converge into a general capacity of awareness.

It is interesting to note at this juncture that this area of convergence seems to be equated with an elementary awareness of personal identity. By the very fact that I am aware of the differences between the distinct kinds of sensation, we must agree that there are differences in sensation.\textsuperscript{54}

5. Discussion

The significance of Aristotle's doctrine of the soul can hardly be overestimated, in spite of the ambiguities and uncertainties with which it leaves us regarding the theory of human emotion. Aristotelianism raised the basic questions and provided the conceptual framework for every theory of emotion for many centuries and at any rate until the age of the Enlightenment. Philosophical anthropology often balanced on the edge of hierarchical and dualist conceptions. The basic distinctions between appetite, rational volition and reason, action and passion have set their stamp on the perennial discussions. In particular, the association of the essence of things and living creatures with their activity and perfection, has left deep traces in Western thinking. Following Aristotle, passion could only be conceived of as 'something-to-be-filled-with-action.'\textsuperscript{55}

The whole discussion surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian \textit{nous} was not at all closed at the end of the Middle Ages. The interpretation which insisted on the existence of a separate \textit{nous} also favoured the rise of medical physiology. It is likely that Arab medical literature, stamped by the monopsychist interpretation of Aristotle (transcendent and supra-individual spirit), dominated and enriched the naturalist thinking of the famous school of Padua, which enhanced the study of anatomy and physiology, including the physiology of emotions, to new heights.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54} Cf. \textit{De anima} 426b 20; if one accepts the view that the immediate self-awareness of the central faculty characterizes the human person as an animal, that is, as a sentient being, then there is an important conclusion, drawn explicitly by Kahn (op.cit., p. 30) "... there is for Aristotle an important distinction which the traditional concept of consciousness tends to ignore, between the intellectual activity as such and our personal awareness of it. In Aristotle's view, our personal consciousness as men belongs essentially to our sentient, animal nature." There appears to be a fundamental distinction between noetic and sensory awareness. Noetic self-awareness is the prerogative of the gods.

\textsuperscript{55} Hillman, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 163: "In one respect—emotions can ultimately be traced to a root concept of not-being." Hillmann refers, among others, to Heidegger's concept of '\textit{Angst}' closely connected with the idea of '\textit{das Nichts}' and to Freud's concept of unconsciousness—anxiety serving as a signal of the hidden (non-existent) existence of the unconsciousness.

\textsuperscript{56} Cf. G. Verwey, \textit{Psychiatry in an Anthropological and Biomedical Context. Philosophical Presuppositions and Implications of German Psychiatry 1820–1870}, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985, pp. 9–34 (p. 21 in particular). Verwey even states that the debates between the so-called 'physicists' and 'somaticists' in the early nineteenth century can be traced back
In the works of Descartes both the break with the Aristotelian (Scholastic) tradition and the indebtedness to it becomes clear. His definition of emotion in Les passions de l'âme shows this dramatically. Emotions are divided into components and these reflect Aristotelian distinctions. Emotions are defined as passions of the soul and actions of the body. As bodily actions passions incite the will to do the things for which they prepare the body. As passions of the soul they must be understood as perceptions by means of which the soul is related to itself. Notwithstanding the real interaction between soul and body, the scientific concepts of action and passion must be held strictly separated. As Riese states in a work on medical thought in the 17th century, passions are thought to belong to two distinct orders: namely, to the medical and the moral. In medicine they are treated as pathological symptoms and in ethics they are conceived of as vices.

Finally, our discussion of Aristotelian psychology gives rise to a question regarding Herman Dooyeweerd's anthropology. Dooyeweerd strongly resists both dualism and the Aristotelian-Scholastic doctrine of substance. Decisive in this regard is his idea of the concentric directedness of all aspects of the cosmic time order to the supra-temporal I-ness and to the origin of meaning. Man's uniqueness, his spirituality, should not be sought for in one of the higher levels of existence. In other words, this uniqueness is not restricted to one of these higher levels. Nor must this uniqueness be separated from man's 'natural' life. However, I do question whether Dooyeweerd has sufficiently integrated the idea of the concentric directedness of the human I-ness in the theory of the enkaptic structural whole.

This ingenious theory, which, among other things, forms the basis of Dooyeweerd's anthropology, he developed as an alternative to the (Neo-) Scholastic philosophy and to what he calls the 'aggregate theories.' The former neglects the sphere-sovereignty of the substructures of the enkaptic whole, while the latter tends to substantialize the constituent parts without integrating them into a real unity. Dooyeweerd states that the different individuality-structures are not simply intertwined, but that the inter-structural interlacements are 'realized in one and the same typically qualified form-

to the different philosophical anthropological positions of Platonism, respectively Aristotleanism.

---

57 Stoic and Galenic influences on Descartes should also be mentioned.
58 René Descartes, Les passions de l'âme, articles 25, 27, 40, 47. He rejects the partition of the soul; cf. article 68. Cf. also my 'Descartes over emoties.' Het spontane en het instrumentale lichaam in de cartesiëanse antropologie, Philosophia Reformata, 54 (1989), 4-28.
60 W. J. Ouweneel, however, tends to restrict 'spirituality' to the act-structure and calls it the spiritual structure. See his De leer van de mens: proeve van een christelijken-wijziijger antropologie, Amsterdam: Buitjen & Schipperheijn, 1984, p. 185ff. For my criticism of this work see my article, 'Psychology als empirische antropologie,' Radix 11(1985), 229-241. This restriction, in my view, leads to the unintended consequence of connecting the idea of human I-ness more closely to the higher than to the lower functions and individuality-structures. Ouweneel's Psychologie. Een christelijke kijk op het mentale leven (Amsterdam: Buitjen en Schipperheijn, 1984) shows this unintended consequence clearly in relation to psychotherapy: with respect to different problems (i.e. modal levels) there are differences in closeness to the supra-temporal heart (p. 356).
totality embracing all the interwoven structures in a real enkaptic unity ... It is significant that this ‘form-totality’ does not automatically coincide with the (qualifying function of the) highest individuality-structure. It is sometimes described as a foundational layer. In the case of man, it is the form of the body which morphologically binds the four individuality-structures (the physical, biotic and psychic individuality structures and the act structure).

My criticism of Dooyeweerd's doctrine of the enkaptic structural whole in its application to anthropology concerns the determining role which the highest individuality-structure, that is, the act-structure, plays in defining the body as a human body. Only because the first three substructures are bound up within the fourth act-structure they can form an essential part of the human body or can be called 'human' at all. Dooyeweerd illustrates his claim by pointing to the process of decomposition of the body after death. The physical-chemical structures are 'liberated,' he says, and obey at that time the laws of the physical-chemical aspect as such. He depicts the body as a hierarchical series of structures, each higher structure embracing and binding up within itself the lower ones, while the lower ones orient themselves to the principles of the higher functions. This depiction is strengthened through the almost implicit suggestion that the lower structures are rather undifferentiated from the point of view of the higher structures. The former obtain their specific human character only in the anticipation of the latter. Thus, in spite of the idea of the concentration of functions, as an

---

62 Ibidem, p. 695. There is a difference then between enkapsis 'as such' and the enkaptic structural whole, the latter expressing a real unity. And there is also a difference between the part-structures of an aggregate and the individuality structures of the enkaptic structural whole, the former 'are functioning in' (p. 769), 'produced by' (p. 774), 'taken up within' (p. 775), 'realized within' (p. 775), 'obeying the form-laws' of the enkaptic structural whole, i.e. the cell, the living body.

63 Ibidem, pp. 767, 777. In the case of the living body, it is the objective sensory image of the materialized body which, simultaneously, gives 'objective' expression to the higher structures, i.e. the sensorium and in a human body the act-structure. Perhaps Dooyeweerd focusses so much on the sensory form-totality, the visible morphology of the body, because of the fact that 'naive experience' immediately grasps the nature of a living body (man or animal) and that in the case of the human being, one's character and intentions become clearly manifest in one's visible verbal and non-verbal expressions.

64 Cf. Dooyeweerd's 32 propositions on man under the title, 'De leer van de mens in de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee,' Sola fide, 7(1954)nr. 2: "X. Het menselijk lichaam is opgebouwd als een enkaptisch geheel in een viertal individualiteitsstructuren, waarvan telkens de lagere in de hogere morfologisch gebonden zijn. De natuurlijke lichaamsvorm of lichaams-gestalte is dus het knooppunt der vervlechtingen tussen de onderscheiden structuren...."

65 Ibidem, "XI: Voor zover men de drie lagere structuren in haar interne ... eigenwettelijkheid vat buiten haar binding in de vierde of hoogste structuur, zijn zij nog niet als eigenlijke deelstructuren van het menselijk lichaam te verstaan. Eerst door haar successieve binding in de vierde structuur worden zij tot wezenlijke onderdelen van het enkaptisch structuurgeheel, dat 'menselijk lichaam' heet."

66 Ibidem, proposition XIII. Ouweneel follows Dooyeweerd on this point. See Ouweneel, De leer van de mens, p. 190, 193.

67 This criticism is weakened by the fact that the act-structure also seems at times to embrace the concentration on the human I-ness, i.e. the directedness of all functions to the unique spiritual act-centre. Cf. Ibidem, propositions XX, XXIV. Dooyeweerd's terminology is slightly inconsistent, because in proposition XXII he explicitly states that the (supra-temporal) spirit transcends all temporal functions, that is to say, it transcends the act-structure. His term 'geestelijke uitdrukkingsvermogen,' i.e. of the human body and the act-structure, is an attempt to bridge these two formulations.
indication of the mystery of human personhood, the act-structure seems to function as a hierarchical framework, binding up the lower structures within itself and rendering these their specific human character.

This inconsistency seems, at first sight, to be of theoretical relevance only. However, on closer consideration it proves to be of vital importance in relation to the theory of emotion. Although it is bound up in the act-structure, emotional expression as such cannot be qualified as an act. The expression of emotions is usually absorbed, as it were, in acts with an supra-psychic modal qualification, for example, socially or morally qualified acts. As a matter of fact, emotional expression as such seems to presuppose, according to Dooyeweerd, the temporary suspension of the guiding supra-psychic normativity. An outburst of rage seems only conceivable as caused by a temporary suspension of the ties of the act-structure. Dooyeweerd's theory of the human body as an enkaptic structural whole at least suggests this rather unattractive account of emotion.

My alternative to this account would be to defend that even emotional outbursts are, in fact, responsive to the normative principles of the supra-psychic modalities. It is rather artificial to isolate emotional expressions 'as such' from the emotionally determined acts. Moreover, the psychic aspect of these acts has a normativity of its own, drawn in analogical anticipation to supra-psychic modalities. Even when persons seem to lack supra-psychic subject functions, as may be the case in sleep, perhaps, or in severe psychiatric and somatic illness, this does not break the ties of the act-structure. The fact that the supra-psychic aspects remain presupposed in the evaluation of such conditions make clear that these ties are not really broken. They may well be temporarily closed on the subjective side; from the normative side they still function as the normative background against which the particular behaviour of the person ought to be evaluated. If not, then even in the case of the most basic elementary emotional phenomena, not only the relational, but above all the personal character of a subject's emotional expression must be questioned. In Dooyeweerd's conception this question must indeed be raised. He fails to account for the indisputable personal character of human emotions, especially emotional outbursts.

Can justice be done to the emotions within any hierarchical ordered conceptual framework? This question served as our guide in discussing Aristotelian psychological and anthropological conceptions. Adherents of the hierarchical model either tend to identify human destiny with life dominated by the highest principle of the ladder of being, or as the case may be, functioning (in Aristotle it is contemplation), or tend to substantialize one of the functions. Closely connected with this choice is the problem of conceptualizing the idea of human personhood. The Aristotelian doctrine

---

stands up favourably against dualist conceptions, which are incapable of accounting for the unity of the human person. Dooyeweerd's philosophy contains the germs for a real alternative to any dualist or hierarchical conception. However, his theory of the enkaptic structural whole, in its application to anthropology in particular, needs to be revaluated and refined.\(^6\)

\(^6\) For an attempt along this line see my article "Emotie als struktueurbioeleem. Een onderzoek aan de hand van Dooyeweerd's leer van het enkaptisch struktuurgeheel." Philosophia reformata 54 (1989), 29-43.