VOLLENHOVEN’S LEGACY FOR ART HISTORIOGRAPHY
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In the cacaphony of highly trained art historical voices today one can hear the painful wages of our Western Rationalistic sin in theoretical endeavours: eclectic confusion, learned scepticism, nihilistic provocation, begging for attention. The professional standard of “objective” scholarship set by Alois Riegl (1858-1905) and Heinrich Wolfflin\(^1\) (1864-1945) for a differentiated discipline of art historiography has become largely discredited in the last decades, because the covert Positivist ideology of logocentric, factistic scientism’ has been found wanting in weighing out the peculiar qualities and worth of graphic art in and for society.\(^2\)

More serious still is the forthright calling into question today of any unified history of art: art has no self-evident nature; art objects are not unique monuments to be housed and admired intact in niches of a musée imaginaire, but are intertextual puzzles whose “norms” are constantly changing; and historical continuity of succession is a myth.\(^3\) Warburg authority figure E.H. Gombrich,\(^5\) who sees Hegel’s totalizing ghost haunting every historiographic attempt, idealist or materialist, to bring closure of judgment to the art\([49]\) historical

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\(^1\) Wolfflin has been known in English-speaking lands more than Riegl because Riegl remained mostly untranslated into English until recently. It is interesting to note how the positivistic science note sounded by Wolfflin was softened in the English translation. Wolfflin wrote: “...wenn man auch jederzeit so sieht, wie man sehen will, so schliesst das doch die Möglichkeit nicht aus, dass es eine Gesetz im ganzen Wandel gibt. Dies Gesetz zu erkennen, wäre ein Hauptproblem, das Grundproblem einer wissenschaftlichen Kunstgeschichte” (“Einleitung,” 1915, to Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe [Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co Ag, 19841], p.31). The English version, translated by M.D. Hottinger, omits the important word “wissenschaftlich”: “To determine this law would be a central problem, the central problem of a history of art” Principles of Art History (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), p.17.


\(^5\) But see Carlo Ginzburg’s incisive analysis of how Gombrich has subverted the conception of Warburg’s program, in “Da A. Warburg a E.H. Gombrich (Note su un problema di metodo),” Studi Medievali; serie terza (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull’alto Medioevo) 7 (1966): 1061
process, continues to feed the uneasy dissemination of suspicion that no “history articulated within a discursive framework based upon centrality, homogeneity, or the continuity of self-identity can be other than oppressive”.

The breakup of a dominating positivism in art historical scholarship bodes opportunity for the committed theorist who self-critically knows what he or she stands for. But you do not have to be Hercules to realize that after one of the hydra’s heads has been cut off, you have only scotched the snake, not killed it. Power politic struggles between deconstructive critics of art history and would be semiotic colonialists of the art historical discipline, along with the seductive moves of historiographic bricolage face one at every step. Brilliant, scattered fragments of critique are so much easier to fashion than positing a fruit bearing thesis. All the current noise in the excitement of our post-Positivist age (or as my colleague Graham Birtwistle aptly put it recently, our presumed “post-guilt” age, where theorists wash their hands of any complicity or rootage in the past): all the turmoil does not help a Christian say, like koheleth, that there is nothing new under the sun in scholarship ...except scripturally directed theory which shows a Way to go that honours the Rule of the Lord. Such a single-minded project occasions embarrassment more than opposition, because old, wornout “Christian” slogans have made redemptive cups of cold water suspect.

I happen to believe, however, that there is a certain sanity to Vollenhoven’s conception of historiography which bodes wisdom and healing service to the stymied ingenuities at large today in the field of writing art history. Let me mention certain features of Vollenhoven’s legacy that prompt the programmatic contours of my proposed cartographic methodology for keeping art history.

Methodical insight is only born out of painstaking, long-term research, said Vollenhoven.

(1) Good method is not a quick fix for incidental problems, but sets limits to sources, field of investigation, and the nature of what gets processed in a multifarious world. So a sound art historical method would focus upon significant changes in artistic matters, and protect the historian from slipknot wandering into psychological and societological pronouncements.

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7 “There is no history that is not uninvested ideologically: At issue is the question as to whether any history articulated within a discursive framework based upon centrality, homogeneity, or the continuity of self-identity can be other than oppressive.” Donald Preziosi, *Rethinking Art History, Meditations on a coy science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p.44.

8 At a workshop on “Creation order and the ‘wanton chance’ of artistic disorder,” in a conference in Toronto celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto; forthcoming.

Because artworks and artistic events are human-made entities, the art whose history one tracks naturally embodies circumstantially myriad non-artistic features, not the least of which is the wile and guile of us human makers. But art history, following Vollenhoven’s lead, will properly be an art history, and not convert art into documents for psychoanalytic or socio-economic history. As Norman Bryson puts it, the art historical point of Gericault’s portraits of the mad, and Manet’s Olympia at the Salon of 1865, is that they “overturned” categories of painterly discourse; that the artworks did not reform insane asylums or prostitution in France is not material to their art historical significance.10

(2) Already early on Vollenhoven stated clearly that Scripturally directed thinking would help history-keeping see that the fundamental struggle on the face of the earth from the fall of Adam and Eve to the final judgment day return of Jesus Christ is the knock-down battle between the Spirit of God and what the Bible calls Sarx and its legions to rule the cultivating work of human hands, including artistry.11 For millenia of humankind, from Babylonian ziggurat, Egyptians temples of the pharaohs, and African tribal dances in circumcision rites of passage: brilliant vanity and imaginative perversity largely carried the day. Then there arose a millennium of sacred icons, courtly love poems, soaring cathedrals, and madrigals, where a holy spirit and strange gods, as it were, vied and allied in empowering exquisitely crafted artistic labours, until such artificial synthesis of allegiances lost its attraction, and a pure bred secularist dynamic weaned itself on humaniora.

That is, Vollenhoven claims as biblically informed the thesis that the history of the world is one and once-only, and Jesus Christ’s birth-death-resurrection-ascension and prospective triumphant return to earth is a central historical reality which in principle blocks out the major periods of happenings on earth B.C. and A.D.12 And within that B.C./A.D. period framework, our “last days” of history,13 since the actual happening of Pentecost, are marked principally by the body of Christ’s wrestling, as K.J. Popma brings to the fore, with demonic principalities,14 whether it be domination under the so-called pax romana Roman Empire, the chiliastic Dritte Reich, or the Utopian angel-of-light culture “made in USA.” According to

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14 Cf. Jaap Klapwijk, “Over Mogelijkheden van Christelijk Filosoferen,” in Mededelingen
Vollenhoven, as I understand his Augustinian thought, Christ’s communion of followers being buffeted by a succession of incognito, violent *exousiae* and pervasive *dunameis* is the primal scream of suffering which historians need to hear, or their historiographic vision will be biblically off-center.

Thanks to God’s grace our creaturely theatre of operation is more complicated than a stark Armageddon.

(3) Not only is there misleading sin within the generations of the people of God, but the peoples of the world and their cultural leaders live and move and have their meaning in the reliable matrix of creational ordinances like seedtime and harvest, summer and winter, a chromosomal DNA genetic code, the order of irreducible difference between feelings and thoughts, the comeuppance of bankruptcy for profligate commerce, the limits to ethical infidelity: creational bounds to which creatures are willynilly subject testify to the provident presence of God mitigating evil.

It was the genius of Vollenhoven to identify various typical philosophical categorial framework constructions which seem to show up over the ages, apparently because the abiding cosmonomic universe has regular dimensions which admit of recurrent, different cosmogono-cosmological assessments. The historian of philosophy must beware, said Vollenhoven, of reducing the given texts read to too few schematic formats, if one wants to honour the richness of the many contributions to human knowledge; and it is so that how philosophies systematically conceive of the structural fabric of reality is secondary in importance to their innovative “historical” place. But it belongs to the redemptive work of historiography, if I follow Vollenhoven correctly, as the historian tracks any specific trail, always to diagnose the intersecting axes impinging upon a given human artefact like philosophy or art: the systematic, repeatable purview the human conception adopts, and the non-repeatable period dynamic which stirs the particular piece or oeuvre under review. Otherwise the historian does not honour the concretely connected -contemporary cultural kinship *and* persuaded human tradition -does not honour the cosmically and humanly connected singularity of what one is investigating.

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15 Vollenhoven, *Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte*, 1:594
16 Ibid., 1:591; also, “Derhalve is het geoorloofd to zeggen, dat in de geschiedenis der wijsbegeerte her opkomen van een tijdstrooming aan een wijziging van opvatting inzake het probleem van de plaats der wet valt toe schrijven, daarentegen de visies op de verticale structuur, eenmaal ontstaan, mede door de vorming van scholen, de simultaniteit in de geschiedenis veroorzaken. Daarotn is het opkomen van een nieuwe tijdstrooming hangrijker dan dat van een nieuw type.” From “Conservatisme en Progressiviteit in de wijsbegeerte” [1958], in *Vollenhoven als wijsgeer*, eds. A. Tol & K.A. Bril (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1992), p.313.
17 “Want wie een auteur belicht, heeft, of dit nu in een kort overzicht of in een brede monographie geschiedt,
There is one other basic Vollenhoven thesis I think it is crucial to notice before I try to articulate an art historiographic method swimming in Vollenhoven’s wake.

(4) Given the eschatonic continuity of creation’s course which holy Scripture posits, and the seamless cloth of cosmic creatural ordinances Scripture reveals as God’s calling us creatures to task: because Vollenhoven takes the surd reality of sin seriously, Vollenhoven believes it belongs to the responsibility of an historian to judge, in keeping history, whether whatever is made of an inheritance is historically good or evil, wasteful or redemptive.

That’s a scandal, I realize; but Vollenhoven does not propose or practise historiography as an anonymous, panoptic divinity gazing pitilessly down upon all that transpires. For an historian to make a judgment call on the definite historical fecundity or impoverishment transacted in a given setting once upon a time is simply doing justice in the account to what took place. An historian should indeed not play God or cull self-righteous, moral lessons while describing past incidents. But it makes deep human sense in God’s world to recognize, with the pain of scrupulous integrity, whether the historical appér present was rightly, wrongly, mistakenly, weakly, or enrichingly responded to ... by William Hogarth in the Enlightenment British artworld, or by Zeno of Kition for philosophy in the commercialized heyday of Macedonian Alexandrian Hellenism. To pretend good and evil do not inhere human deeds because as historian one feels more comfortable with a non-committal hermeneutic of deferral or echo is to commit a scandal of an other, abdicatory kind, one which Vollenhoven lamented as lamentable ignorance.

Primed by Vollenhoven’s theses that historiographic method rightly takes a specific focus, that history is fundamentally the story of God’s creation enduring human cultivation during the promised coming final triumph of the Truth over the Lies of false powers, that human art like human philosophy inescapably embodies a committed world-and-life vision of some sort, and...
that historians assume criteria for judging what is historically normative in a field of human
endeavour or forfeit their authority to be listened to: let me now try to translate such thetical
insights into the basic categories of an art historiographic method.

I

A history of anything implies there be a connected story. It is impossible to write a history of
anything without simplifying its story. But every historical account which oversimplifies what one
is recounting distorts the record.

Historians normally recognize endings and beginnings in the becomings they treat. Chapters
in historical writing, like pericopes (paragraphs) in a text, signal the rounding off ending and
beginning of a different phase within the succession of something; but this “break” in the
story is not the absolute ceasing of entitary existence, and also not the mere mark of
astrophysical change in date, like a new year number, 1717 A.D. The selah or chapter
caesurae in the tale historians tell bespeak subtle, crucial interpretive decisions on significant
changes in the course of an identity being traced. A fundamental question is: are there good
ontical grounds for such historiographic pauses? Given the overriding temporal continuity of
creational reality, what affords the conjunctive possibility of temporal creatural discontinuities?

I can do no more than adumbrate here the bitterly contested reality of historical period. The old schema of Augustine which read the progressive revelation of God’s Rule on earth in
history to be a step by step dispensational supercession of earlier ages—ante legem
superseded by sub lege replaced by sub gratia Christi (to which others following Montanus
added the new age of the Spirit)—gradually gave way in European Humanist reflection to the
position that we humans set the Spirit of the times in play. A consuming rationalist faith in
human progress, later relativized by a pervasive historicism among leaders, which highlighted
the incredible complexity of any given cultural period of time, further served to undermine
“epoch” as too global a category for delineating trenchant features of composite human deeds
at some one time or other. A nominalist climate and a pervasive individualistic temper in the

22 For a sharp-eyed, insightful overview cf. Gotz Pochat, “Der Epochenbegriff and die Kunstgeschichte,” in
Kategorien and Methoden der Deutschen Kunstgeschichte 1900-1930, ed. Lorenz Dittmann (Stuttgart: Franz
23 Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception [1967], trans. T. Bahti (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1982), p.78. The diverse referents of the term “historicism” betray the quite different horses any
given thinker is flogging. Cf. Barbara Jo Douglas, Musicology or Musikwissenschaff A study of the work of Carl
academic world today have, like acid, by and large corroded historical periods into conceptual heuristic devices, disposable “metaphors,” which may be utilized for the nonce, but have little referential meaning.\textsuperscript{24}

Hegel’s \textit{Zeitgeist} indeed encumbered the idea of “period” with the onus of being an expendable phase of a monolithic universal rational process, but Riegl’s \textit{Kunstwollen}, a positivist stab at affirming a non-transcendent, atemporal force which regulates periodic changes in style, persisted in maintaining the idea of some fundamental pancultural unity obtaining at a given time.\textsuperscript{25} Old-fashioned Panofsky tends to anchor analysis of the style period of artworks in a supratemporal Weltanschauung of \textit{humanitas} that has unchanging universal permanence.\textsuperscript{26} Even Foucault, dealing in non-scientific knowledges and institutions, who would shun any pancultural solidity, uses “episteme” early on, and later, “archive,” to point to the hologramic inter-positivities of quite different \textit{eras} which despite undefined boundaries still somehow deeply configure the welter of constant transformational goings-on at the many levels of human artefactuality.\textsuperscript{27}

That is, unless one is prepared to return to atomistic recitation of disparate artistic facts and be satisfied with the cohesion of a monograph for studies in artworks or an artist’s oeuvre, some kind of unifying, relating, communifying, over-all matrix is apparently needed for locating and dating the definite cultural presence and power of the art whose changes one as historian is describing. It is so that a cultural period like the European Renaissance is not a solid state of being or values, a hypostatized ideal type which prescribes apriori all that takes place within its confines.\textsuperscript{28} A cultural period like the Enlightenment is also not a passing stage of a grand


process of **poiesis** dialectically enroute to a millenium of well-being. But a cultural period like ancient Near Eastern Hellenism or the cultural drive of modern world-wide Pragmatism is not merely a ghostly appearance either, an egregious over-simplifying label projected by anxious, armchair cataloguers to spook the uninitiated into a classificatory textbook history.

A cultural period I take to be a dated, non-recurring dynamic communion of leadership which manifests in its span of time a certain spirit whose élan sets the dominant pace and pattern of human activity and institutional life at large somewhere. A cultural period is a lived reality. The cultural dynamic for a few generations south of the Alps in the 1400-1500s A.D. called “Renaissance” certainly admits of countervailing cultural tensions (like Pomponazzi’s Scholasticism and Valla’s Humanism), important locale variations (Venice, Florence, Rome); and various sectors of cultural life (music, painterly art, politics, commerce, church, transportation) vary in picking up the Renaissance beat. But the Renaissance cultural dynamic is discernibly quite different from the cultural drive of the Reformation in those days, and not just because Luther’s songs take place north of the Alps. Savonarola is not a “Renaissance man,” but Francois I at Fontainbleau certainly does breathe, like the Roman church under the Borgia popes, an infectious, this-worldly sacra ambitio.

To give a concrete idea of cultural period, an example of a cohering cultural dynamic, let me try to build up an Erwartungshorizont (Jauss) that would parlay what in art history has often been called “rococo” period style into an emblem of what I think characterizes the ludic rationalism of Enlightenment Europe.

Gainsborough [Mary Countess Howe] shows the favourite colour of rose along with a touch of the delicate chinoiserie fashion of the day. A defining shape in favour was the concave shell, for ladling soup or as pattern for your bedstead. Expensive, fragile porcelain fit the salon and

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31 One could say that young John Calvin, for example, in his dissertational commentary on Seneca’s *De clementia* (1532) was working his thought loose from what Vollenhoven carefully calls the late (“derde”) synthesis of “Christian Humanism,” distinct from both a Renaissance and Reformation orientation (Vollenhoven, *Kort Overzicht van de Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte voor den Cursus Paedagogiek* Amsterdam: Theja, 19561: 28-33). The tribute to Plato in Calvin’s *Institutiones Christianae religionis* (1533, l, xv, 6-8), is also evidence of the ongoing struggle and weaning of deep-going allegiances which takes place within any given time, although the whole *Institutes* treatise breathes devotion to the Lord’s Rule on earth, and Calvin’s intent to instil piety in God’s needy people.
its art of polite conversation on the respective merits of French and Italian music, on what is beautiful and what sublime, where repartee is normative, wit essential, and sallies of l’esprit crucial for your social existence. Idle high society in Venice confessed a world as make-believe as possible, with carnivals and masked balls lasting for months. A fake bridge on an artificial lake would be constructed for the view, to be admired from the distant picture window at Kenwood House in England during dessert where the soiree was being held. In Paris Madame Pompadour was virtual minister of culture for French society: lifestyle des lumières was defined by dalliance tête-à-tête in the park, coquetry, gallantry, flirtation paired with decorum, epitomized in the minuet danced on gleaming parquay floors near Chippendale furniture, where evil seems to be an impropriety! The culture of Queen Anne and Louis XV and Frederick der Grosse breathed the spirit of refinement, le coeur sensible, sentiment, the Empfindsamkeit of Scarlatti chamber music, Couperin, Goldoni –

One could go on indefinitely, committing what Gombrich calls the “physiognomic fallacy,” noting that philosophy of the Enlightenment period was conceived and performed differently than philosophy constructed during a somewhat earlier Scientialistic “episteme” where Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Leibniz, Spinoza, Baumgarten, exuded an air of universal calculus of analysis. Voltaire does philosophy by story, le conte of Candide; Diderot writes philosophical articles in an Encyclopédie organized alphabetically rather than systematically; theater-poet Schiller puts philosophy into short letters for a duke; Hume’s philosophy comes in essays called “Enquiries”: the spirit infusing the philosophes and contouring

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32 John Gay’s poem, “The Fan” (1714) describes the role of fans for flirting in church:

The peeping fan in modern times shall rise
through which unseen the female ogle flies;
this shall in temples the sly maid conceal
and shelter love beneath devotion’s veil....

33 Cf. Philippe Minguet’s analysis of the minuet: “…tout est reverence, rencontre, depart feint, pirouette” (L’esthetique du rococo [Paris: J. Vrin, 1966], p.246), so different in feel from the Romantic Schwung of the waltz which appeared around 1760.

34 How mores and morals merge in such minds Roman catholic Alexander Pope puts delicately into “heroic couplets” in his mock-epic “Rape of the Lock”:

...Whether the nymph shall break Diana’s law,
or some frail china jar receive a flaw;
or stain her honour, or her new brocade;
forget her prayers, or miss a masquerade;
or lose her heart, or necklace, at a ball....


36 Cf. Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses, pp. 64-72; Vollenhoven, Kort Overzicht, pp. 34-36.

37 Über die Asthetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, for Schiller’s patron the Duke of Augustenburg.

38 «Die Funktion des Essays, gelehrtes Wissen in ein Ganzes einzuordnen, das Einzelle gegen den Hintergrund des Universalen auszuleuchten und, wenn nicht jedem Menschen, so doch einer geistig aktiven Schicht der Gesellschaft fasslich zu vermitteln, hatte den Intentionen der Aufklärung in besonderer Weise entsprechen
Enlightenment philosophy is as different in temper from the classical grandeur of science written in Latin as Rigaud’s pretty portrait of Louis XIV [Louis XIV en habits de sacre] differs in spirit from Philippe de Champaigne’s presentation of cardinal Richelieu. Richelieu has the formal bearing, la grande maniere of Versailles, Le Brun, and Dryden, while Rigaud’s rococo bedroom version of the Great Louis, flashing a turned leg! bears the imprint, to my eye, of the cultural dynamic to seek the flirtational life, a sunny-side-up liberty, and pursuit of elegant happiness. Even Immanuel Kant in his light-hearted 1764 Beobachtungen—which Kant took very seriously—has all the verve and play of the Aufklärung. Enlightenment culture has a ludic spirit also worlds apart, one might say, from the somewhat later Romantic Idealist cultural dynamic of adventuresome cruelty and crusade for la gloire de la France stirring much of the artistry, for example, of Delacroix.

The way I should like to redeem the category of cultural period as cultural dynamic is first of all to recognize that one is not tracking an historical trail when you detect the reigning thrust of a certain cultural dominance. You do not get an art history by using art as documents for examining cultural periods. But Gombrich and others go wrong, in my judgment, to think artworks are intrinsically incommensurable, because dated/located human artwork has an aura, a definite bearing, a discernible marked empowering in its allusive meaning which aura it shares with other layered cultural phenomena of the day. True, a cultural period dynamic does not drop out of heaven full blown and unchallenged, but materializes out of trends, currents, homogenous movements in varied arenas of culture, which may not last generations-long enough or reach a broad enough hegemonic strength somewhere to set and qualify a cultural period. Different generations of leaders at home in the same cultural dynamic also seriate and complicate its waxing and waning hold on certain zones of human life. But the jealous aegis of each cultural period constitutes a compelling horizon for human position-taking and human generation and completion of deeds.


A second thesis of mine would be that there is no predictable inter-period connection, no rise and fall between cultural periods. I do think that within a cultural period dynamic there are usually discernible stages of a generation’s responsibility toward initiation, consolidation, or ramification of a cultural period’s regime. There are also normally within a period dynamic telltale marks of suicide with which idolatry is fraught. But each cultural period dynamic is intrinsically at odds with any other cultural dynamic in force at the same time. Cultural periods like Renaissance, Enlightenment, Positivism, Pragmatism—which are not a class of chronology—occur disjunctively, and are uncanny historical forces apriori conditioning, almost environmentally, empowering and ruining, abetting, directing, thwarting what happens as the work of human hands—art, philosophy, war, church doctrine, whatever. To my knowledge Vollenhoven never worked out any clear connection between his major periodization of history for philosophy—before and after synthetic-Christian philosophy—and what Vollenhoven came to call “tijdstromingen.” But that is the crux I am after: recognition that the cultural milieu embedding art is not inert but lethal, fertile, an impelling and often imploding drive for the art to be “reborn” (Renaissance), “enlightened,” “positive” (“Impressionism”), thoroughly “pragmatic.” Yet a cultural period dynamic is not in any historical sequence.

42 Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte, 1:18
44 Vollenhoven’s description has always seemed to me too neat how, because of the combat between the exaggerations of Scientialism and Practicalism, “...wordt het nodig, opeen verzoening bedacht to zijn. Daarmee is dan de tijd aangebroken voor het Oude Idealisme, dat Scientialisme en Practicalisme met elkander verhindt” (Kort Overzicht, p. 34). The same pattern is found by Vollenhoven to be evident in the series of Positivism, NeoPositivism, and Neoldealism, in late Rationalism (Kort Overzicht, p. 37). It is true, as Vollenhoven says: “Een periode in de philosophie wordt altijd mede heerst door de voorgaande” (Kort Overzicht, p. 30); but he adds immediately: “De wijze, waarop dit geschiedt, is niet steeds dezelfde. Soms constateert men vooral afhankelijkheid, omdat de latere periode in sterke mate aan de traditie trouw blijft. Dan weer valt een krachtige reactie waar te nemen. Maar ook reactie is een soen van afhankelijkheid. Want gegeven is dan datgene waartegen men vecht.” J.H.J. Pot’s caution remains: “De invloed van de wereldbeschouwing op de periodisering mag zich echter alleen uitstrekken tot het gezichtspunt, van waaruit men de geschiedenis indeelt en niet leiden tot een apriorische constructie van het verloop van de geschiedenis zelf” (De Periodisering der Geschiedenis, Een overzicht der theorieen [Hague: W.P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1951], diss., p. 34). In my judgment the “succession” of cultural period dynamics blows where they list, because “periods” are dynamis and not blocks-of-time or cross-sections of the underlying processional bed of eschatonic duration integral to creatural reality. Hans Robert Jauss’ early program of Receptionsgeschichte wrestles with this very problem by encouraging -aonrat evat of the event character of earlier literary works, plumbing the older text’s “original negativity,” that is, its upset of the first readerly expectations (Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literatur-Wissenschaft [Konstanz: Universitätsverlag, 1967], pp. 20-22). [This note is developed as a partial response to Sander Griffioen’s excellent question at the presenta presentation of this article as a lecture on 6 November 1992. Cf. also note 61 below.]
Finally, although it makes me a bit uneasy, I understand the anonymous neutronic power of such a cultural period dynamic to be the presence of those inscrutable *dynameis, exousiae, archai*, with which the Bible says we humans contend (Ephesians 6:10-18, Colossians 1:15-20). Their contagious presence as a third dimension to human artworks is precisely why an historical account cannot be rationally boxed in and gift-wrapped; there is much more to the history of art, Horatio, than is dreamt of in any would be scientific causal-chain methodology. But an historian then is called upon to penetrate through to, name and expose whatever the cultural dynamic in force be in the artwork scrutinized -Christian scholarship always has a quiet facet of critical exorcism—\(^45\) to show the fascinating entrapment in how Positivism, Pragmatism, Nihilism, or how Enlightenment art, for example, sweetly beckons its patrons to accept delight that is too good to be true. Taking cultural period dynamic to heart can also meet a concern Vollenhoven had, to avoid anachronistic judgments, like reading our current circumstances back into earlier times or seeing our present state “anticipated” by former ages.\(^46\) Only when an historian recognizes and lets the power of an other earlier cultural period dynamic speak its own piece can one come to know the limits of our own times, and avoid parochiality.\(^47\)

II

A second major coordinate for mapping out the complexity of horizons impinging upon artworks which an art historian needs to expect is the reality of what I shall call *typiconic formats*. Just as there are a number of categorial frameworks exercised by philosophers throughout the ages such that Heidegger, for example, latches onto Anaximander as a kind of fine philosophical

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\(^47\) “Wohl die grosste Gefahr dieser Art von Existentialisierung ist der Verlust an Vergleichsmoglichkeiten, der zu einem unliegbaren Sieg der Literaturkritik fiber die eigentliche Literaturgeschichte gefuhrt hat. Denn durch these Verheutigung oder Vergegenwartigung tritt häufig eine Beschrankung auf die ‘Moderne’ ein, die ihre Vorteile hat, jedoch allzu oft in ein modisches Manover entartet.” Jost Herman, “Ober Nutzen and Nachteil Literarischer Epochenbegriffe,” *Monatshefte* 58 (no. 1, Spring 1966): 300.
source, and Gadamer’s systematic approach to hermeneutics is especially appreciative of a Heracleitan thought pattern (inspite of Hegel’s also being partial to *coincidentia oppositorum*), so too there is a plurality of definite world-and-life-visions whose contours are firm enough to be distinct from one another, and which seem to give shape to the artistic and literary endeavours of humans throughout the generations. I don’t mean to suggest there be a warehouse of Platonic noeta where artists shop for frameworks to give their work a certain profile. Apprentices in Rubens’ workshop picked up their Rubenesque configuring practice existentially; students at Hogarth’s alternative Academy in St. Matin’s alternative Academy in St. Matin’s Lane practised a different line of beauty than that prescribed by Sir Joshua Reynolds at the Royal Academy: a beginning artist’s training carries the knowhow in differently molded vessels. It is normal for an artist to belong initially to a “school” of art, with a cachet as pronounced as handwriting; little telltale features make visible whether you were taught in Ingres or David’s atelier, or belong to the stable at Warhol’s New York Factory.

Working with the fact that artists enter their profession informally formatted by a certain earlier generational construct in artistry, and spired by the Vollenhovian legacy of various enduring typical philosophical conceptions, I have identified several basic ways artists (including music composers, novelists, architects, choreographers, cinematic auteurs) prefabricate, as it were, their symbolific presentations of meaning. By “typiconic format” I do not mean an apriori structure as analytically precise as a philosophical categorial framework, and I am not dealing in psychological or mythopoeic archetypes. Typiconic format refers to how the artist frames his or her artistic production to be imaginatively received. The framing may not be self-conscious, may or may not be self-critical, and certainly has shadowy borders appropriate to a subliminal, preconceptual weighting of cosmic emphases and societal priorities; but the framing typiconic format gives artwork focus, like specially filtered eye glasses, to configure the playing field on which and in which things happen, are depicted, heard, habituated, followed, and then presented by the artist. Again, typiconic format is not conceptual, not semantic in nature, but is an imaginative apriori which gives a specific cast, a typical cast, to an artist’s work. The framing is not pronounced as exclusive, but in its very unobtrusive decisions on certain relational questions of what is life-important, what is subsidiary, what connects, what portents are possible, a typiconic format claims to be relatively all-embracing.

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Vanbergen’s sustained, insightful analysis of *typus* may phrase the matter more semiotically than I care to, but if I understand his writing correctly, his acute probe of *typus* as an encoded artistic tradition[^49] related to but distinct from genres[^50] gets close to my Vollenhovian category of “typiconic format,” the types of esemplastic (Coleridge term) hold operant in artworks. *Types* states Vanbergen, like “the rape of Europa,” “une tempete sur terre,” “figure at the window,”[^51] are more than iconographic motifs with lexical identifications; types are really process-geared, perceptual formations of the content being, in Vanbergen’s terms, “predicated” by the artist, determining the way a representation means. A *genre* like still life, “history painting,” *vedute*, or portrait, is a class of painterly art with features common to its members; but “types” for Vanbergen are a configuration of features functional within the whole of an artwork, a sort of internal context of the representation itself, which is nevertheless not the same for all the pieces in its type.[^53]

To give provocative body to my theoretical proposal let me sketch and give names to a few typiconic formats I have inductively found to be orientations recurrently adopted by artists great and small for a long time.[^54]

* a “mystical” typiconic format whose preoccupied slant moves to transcend the visible, tending to hover tremulously beyond our ken, prone to theosophic and anthroposophic eurhythmic incandescence [El Greco, Fuseli, Brancusi, Kandinsky, Chagal, De Branding];

[^51]: *Voorstelling en Betekenis*, pp. 45-49.
[^52]: “De figuur is dus niet slechts een enonce of uitspraak, onder de vorm van een geïdentificeerde figuur, maar zij is vooral een enonciation, d.w.z. een wijze waarop de voorstelling met de Betekenis van een figuur, maar haar eigen hetekenis door de figuur tot uitdrukking brengt.” *Voorstelling en Betekenis*, p.47. Cf. pp. 54-55, 67-68, 123-24.
[^53]: “Genres zijn natuurlijk ook een vorm van meer algemene typen, maar zij hebben niet een gelijkwaardige verklarende, hermeneutische functie. Waar her genre bestaat uit een aantal kenmerken die aan alle werken die ertoe behoren gemeenschappelijk zijn, bestaat een typus uit een configuratie van kenmerken die functioneel zijn binnen een geheel. Deze configuratie is uiteraard niet dezelfde in alle werken die tot dat type behoren. Het bepalen van de typus van een werk is dus met hetzelfde als bet onderbrengen van dit werk in een duidelijke klasse.” *Voorstelling en Betekenis*, p. 75.
[^54]: N.B. In the text here I list typical examples across different cultural period dynamics. For the Vollenhoven-kenners I include mention in small print on the accompanying chart the somewhat comparable types of philosophical conceptions Vollenhoven worked with.
an “heroic” type focuses on titanic struggle against attractive evil, a daemonic superhumanity monumentally in tension with the ravishing erotic, where excess is respected [Michelangelo, Rubens, Delacroix, Beckmann, Pollock];

a “picaresque” format—Vollenhoven would have said, “in de lijn van Brueghel en Jan Steen,” Bakhtin would refer to the “carnival” vantage point of Dostoevsky—where the vitality of what is naturally lusty and rough-hewn is celebrated, where the wry, the incongruous, the bawdy comic, is real and appreciated [Hogarth, Daumier, Miro, Lichtenstein];

a “scenic” type quietly spreads out the horizontal world with meticulous wonder and simplicity, and joys in the panoramic stretch of land [Canaletto, Guardi, Diebenkorn];

an “idyllic” typiconic format values some unspoiled perfection next to or within a carefully observed natural landscape, foil to the innocence [Leonardo, Giorgione, Claude Lorrain, Watteau, Gainsborough, Reynolds, Constable, Thomas Cole, a format practically canonized in the happy-ending twist by the Hollywood studios for films from 1933-1945];

a “paradigmatic” typus holds out for compositional restraint, a world of utterly still completion, unchanging paradigms of order [Raphael, Vermeer, Chardin, Cezanne, Braque, Chirico, Senggih];

the “hedonic” type revels in sensuous richness, lush curves of pleasure; the glorious erotic overpowers human task [Correggio, Titian, Boucher, Ingres, Bougereau, Renoir, Klimt];

a typiconic format called “troubled cosmic”, where awareness of unresolved evil needing reconciliation sets the parameters; an unidealized normality is disturbingly deep, and misery as a surd is touched by glimpses of joy [Rembrandt, late Goya, Manet, Van Gogh, Barlach, Rouault].

Let it be said immediately that these typiconic formats I presume to have discerned as loading the artistic dice of many gifted persons over the years are not universalia, are not logical pigeonholes for classificatory purposes - the taxonomy is also probably incomplete -and the fact that various artists’ oeuvres lean into the same typiconic format does not necessarily entail actual historical connection.

Typiconic formats are indeed historical realities, namely, artistic traditions, wonts (time-worn practices of artistry with certain contours) passed on by seasoned practitioners to inexperienced hands, enabling injunctions to do art from and with a certain orientation.55 But one can be born into a given artistic tradition, like into one’s mother tongue, and never question it; or one might

discover a certain typiconic format as if you invented it yourself only to find out later that there is a long line of artists who also independently of you and others found such a picaresque or hedonic way of stamping artworks congenial to one’s outlook and praxis. Assuredly there is an unmistakable personal signature to artworks, which is more than the sum of intertextual references and borrowings,\(^{56}\) which signature sets a given artwork off as some one person’s final responsibility. But no artist is an island without a pedigree, without an artistic inheritance, without some kind of typiconic stance in doing art that shows contours typically similar to other artist’s artwork in God’s world.

A genial, pedagogical strength of Vollenhoven’s approach, emphasizing types of human thought alignments, which I am translating into imaginative constructs embodied apriori in artistic traditions, is that an historian, whose stock in trade is hindsight, is then prompted continually to keep an eye open for similarities, to hear echoes, find parallels, that is, be on the lookout across the arts comparatively, thinking encyclopedically, tentatively, searchingly.

Typiconic formats within dated/located artworks, like the categorial frameworks Vollenhoven delineated in patterns of actual philosophical analysis, may find some resonance in Dilthey’s unleavened roster of *Weltanschauungen*, but are not at all like the rigid, cycllical code of Northrop Frye’s basic narrative categories, or Hayden White’s fourfold *tropoi* claimed to be the range of possible historical consciousnesses.\(^{57}\) Typiconic formats are not abstractions for me: they are as real as a person’s committed vision of what life and death mean, and how one wills or is compelled to order praxis. Typiconic formats are not in a hierarchy, do not follow a fixed succession, do not determine the quality of the artwork;\(^{58}\) but they are relatively *comportable*, and can be a good index to the noticeable shift which takes place, for example, between early (heroic) and late (idyllic) Poussin’s art, or for positioning the differing natures of the clashes between Hogarth and Reynolds, Reynolds and Gainsborough artistry (cf. schematic overview at the end of this article).

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\(^{58}\) While both Boucher (1703-70) and Ingres (1780-1867) have a hedonic cast to their mature artwork, Boucher is a stilted, second-rate painter of figures, while Ingres is a first-class draughtsman.
A pedagogical danger of the cartographic methodology, which holds also for using Vollenhoven’s charts, is to mistake the shorthand sketched overview to be the masterplan printout. The adjacent schematic worksheet is not like a table of chemical elements out of whose archive experiments can be planned, and is also not a strategy chart for military generals to mastermind battles, but is, if we need a guiding metaphor (and do not press it too far), the tentative positionings of movements in a three-dimensional chess game, or real-life pageant, where knights and bishops, castle, pawns and queens play out their parts, have their exits and their entrances; and as historian you are trying to track the traces, the footprints, of the many trails they make.

It may be helpful to say here that the cross of these two x and y axes, the cultural period dynamic and the typiconic format (art tradition), gives one a good bead on the composite character of style - the way humans posit aesthetics imperatives, in all cultural activities as well as in art -so that style is conceived as idyllic-rococo or picaresque-rococo and not left globally “rococo,” or individuated, as if it be handwriting, to the “style” of Watteau. It should be said too that the culturally spirited/typiconically formatted matrix of an artist may not be the most important matter on occasion for an historian to record, although such milieu always enters somehow into history-keeping. For example, the episodic run and melodramatic crises of Dickens’ early novels may be a response to their serialized production and delivery by horse-drawn postal carriages to his avid readers, without discounting in the least the picaresque Victorian, hurlyburly carnival turmoil slanting Oliver Twist. I’m just saying, cartographic coordinates as echafaudage (scaffolding) foster a steadying, comprehensive historical consciousness in the back of one’s mind, but when as historian you tell the tale of the novel or depict the trail of the painterly artwork, you don’t treat types or periods but relate the exploits of flesh and bloody humans who leave footprints.

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60 “The relation between social change and that many-layered form of expression we call a literary text (which can exaggerate, distort, complicate, or embody reality and also create a new world from the materials the outside world provides) will perhaps always remain elusive....There is.... an ecological chain in culture, a network of mutual dependency and influence between art and history that cannot be unravelled but that must nevertheless he respected.” Jean Hagstrum, Sex and Sensibility, Ideal and Erotic Love from Milton to Mozart (University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 10-11.
61 In the 1980 Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism article I called the pancultural reality of a period synchronic (happening together at roughly the same time), the perduring types of worldview perchronic (lasting relatively intact through time), and the third dimensional reality of historical development (where change is ongoing) diachronic. Although I have avoided using these technical terms in this article I should like to make my careful usage clear, because Sausssure and others have only two dimensions. As I understand Sausssure, for him “synchronic” study of language deals with its systematic state as langue, without reference to time, and “diachronic” study of language respects the factual evolution of speech (parole) in time. Al Wolters read Vollenhoven’s method of Problemgeschichte, with Sausssurean terminology, to be saying that “synchronic”
That third coordinate of what actually takes footprinted place - the specific historical thread of something - happening amid continuous traditions and discontinuous cultural periods - is difficult to get precise when it comes to art, because much depends upon the history of what art the historian aims to tell: painterly art? Dutch art and literature? American art - popular art - since the so-called World War II? a history of Rembrandt’s full-orbed artistry? Is there an “art in general” which changes with a simplified connected story line? If art has a differentiated nature, as we know it, is an account of “decoration” in predifferentiated, tribal societal contexts a “pre-history” of art?

Rather than stir up myriad quandaries at this point, let me focus down on three matters and then, rather than argue for the points, try to demonstrate briefly how a cartographic methodology following such imperatives might recount an art historical trail, remembering Vollenhoven’s erudite investigation - more genealogy than historiography? - of ahoristos duas in the folds of prePlatonic philosophical fragments.\textsuperscript{62}

(1) It is a mistake to look for causal influences in affairs artistic to ascertain art history: the historical is to be found in what a new generation makes of its inheritance. The crux to he noted by an historian of art is not so much what is given as what is taken. The historical connection is the unpredictable innovative modification made across the break in continuity. On certain occasions artwork of poorer quality may be historically more important than artwork of superior quality.\textsuperscript{63}
(2) Significant historical changes can be good or evil or both toward what was in the balance. The historical ordinance which art is to follow for good is this: discover surprising ways to hone and enhance the special (disciplined) calling of artistry, integrated within society, so that artwork’s contribution to human life be enriching, refining, celebrative toward praise of God, evoke wisdom, and care of one’s fellow neighbours. An art historian needs to decide, to make a nuanced judgment that is minutely informed and just, on whether the change brought what good or ill. The history to art history is not like a continuation of the same plant, but is more like a report on how the ground has been prepared, nutrients added, polluted, wasted, out of which new seedling plants (artworks) grow.

(3) Art historiography is different from art critical analysis, but the tasks are in tandem. The historian’s work is not finished until the artistic knowledge worth remembering, which has been described in its earlier setting, comes to speak to us today, augments, challenges, somehow modifies our current understanding of reality. It is so, as Kurt Badt says, that earlier artworks are seldom seen in full daylight, but are presented by historians more often with moonlight on a cloudy night.\(^{64}\)

Example of cartographic methodology at work in examining artwork.
Once upon a time just before 1702 when the young displaced Walloon JeanAntoine Watteau (1684-1721) came to Paris, he fell in with the painter Claude Gillot, who was also managing a marionette theatre at the time. To put bread and wine on his table Watteau painted, drew, and designed what was wanted and commissioned by fashionable society: arabesques to fill the panels of salons in hotels and chateaux, chinoiseries, and gallant figures or scenes from \textit{commedia dell’arte} in demand by engravers. Around 1707 Watteau was out-performing his master Gillot, and moved up from hackwork to collaborate with Claude III Audran, curator of the Medici Gallery in Palais de Luxembourg. A folding screen, used to set off private space in a room, with a series of six leaves Watteau designed at this time (c.1709) is worth considering.

The title panel [fig. 1] presents a pastoral scene of courtship in a glade where sheep graze peacefully near quiet waters. A shepherd boy plays flute for a reclining shepherdess; their faithful dog back from fetching sticks looks quizzically. Subterranean to the peaceful fountain is a smiling faun’s head. Plants of growing grain anchor down the bottom corners, and up above cavort dolphins, time-honoured messengers of love. A crown of roses in the upper middle-center hangs suspended over nothing in particular; two of cupid’s torches are alight warming the air so that the phoenix also rises.

In the second panel [fig. 2] Watteau’s shepherd has assumed a smiling, gallant dance posture while a companion pipes at his side. The maiden stands spectrally behind the tree; she’s not really in the picture yet - a fantasy. A medallion with her portrait in profile hangs over the lover’s head with pipes which two winged cupids like wind blow to set in motion. The lower fountain has become rectangular stone draped with a cloak, and the subterranean faun’s head has become a bold set of bagpipes, a folk emblem for male genitalia.

Panels 3, 4, and 5, have identical frames of blossoms and cartouches, and very similar intent: highlighting heroes of the popular situation-love comedy - Colombine, Pierrot and Harlequin. One can notice how the inset down below and the busts dubbed in behind the stage-center figure are finely tuned to reveal and reinforce each stock character. Colombine [fig. 3] serenades softly amid bouquets of flowers and potted plants under a trellis with the pleasant lad in lace collar on her mind; the female busts above her each have one breast covered and hold silence, one frowning slightly and one almost smiling. Pierrot [fig. 4] takes his awkward bow before partly shrouded, puppet-like statuettes; the woman’s face seems sadly averted, and even the partially visible face of Pan (?) has an unusually subdued reticence. The simple girl in country bonnet down below is the most Pierrot could ever hope to attract, temporarily, while the maid beneath Harlequin’s feet [fig. 5] has bells on her neck and bows on her cap. And a statue of Bacchus, topped comically by a basket of vines and debris, chatting with a youngish bacchante, forms a lively backdrop for this wily confidence man talking you into something not wholly trustworthy.

In the final leaf of the series - after the commedia dell’arte figures - Watteau circles back on the first pastoral scene; but now [fig. 6] the courtship of amour - which has perhaps run the gauntlet of the possible comic hindrances? - has ended. We see the maid, crowned with the wreath of flowers, that has always meant womanly victory, seated directly under the symbolic circle of roses suspended in the heavens, as a pastoral queen. Her adoring shepherd lover holds his staff as a ready scepter. Above near the dolphins, cupid’s shooting bow is hung up and his arrows are sheathed, and the torch burns hard; the phoenix goes up in smoke. The original
placid pool of unwaked love has become a narrow rivulet from a tumbling cataract of water that overflows the bottom fountain; and the subterranean satyr has lost his free-wheeling grin.

This piece shows what of art historical worth Watteau was doing in his day: forging an amalgam of domesticated mythology, *commedia dell’arte* types, and pastoral Arcadian motifs, all in a light delicate style of arabesques reminiscent of Fontainbleau’s Primaticcio at the fashionable court of Francois I, whose troubadour courtly love ethic was codified, you could say, by Louis XIII (reigned 1610-1643), into an atmosphere of silken colour tones, archaic clothes, and a fairy-tale dress-up world. But notice what has happened: when idealized shepherds and shepherdesses *and* vernacular comic types easily move within the same universe of discourse, *among* faint notes of mythical allusion, you have an art format able to talk high-flown courtly love with brief dashes of the jester’s bagpipe impudence. Watteau’s winsome “decorations” are unobtrusive, but *they* could stand up as conversation pieces if his patrons were to look at how the emblematic details, the satyr’s faces, for example, or the busts in panels 3, 4, and 5, serve as mental echoes and invisible commentary upon the main visible figure or scene.

Watteau made iconographic history at this same time with *I’Escarpolette* (c.1709), introducing the swing, a folk pastime, into the gallant world of *fetes champetres*. And it is that mix of promenades in the park, rendezvous in fine clothes near a fountain, resting to picnic during the hunt—which were societal realities already in the days of Louis XIV: it is Watteau’s mix of that genteel world with what is coarse that gave him a subtle, critical edge and mute counterthesis in his artwork already before 1710. In a different study I have shown at length how Watteau’s paintings are critical of the society he presented artistically.65

To conclude this sample art historical point one could look at *Les Bergers*, done in 1717 A.D., the same year Watteau’s *Cythara* served as *morceau de reception* at the French Academy. Compared to a garden scene painted by Watteau’s student Lancret of the famed *Camargo Dancing* (c.1730), to the admiration of primly seated women and other gentle folk in a lovely glade where trees act like parasols to bend with benedictions over the graceful scene of sweetness and light, Watteau’s shepherds in *Les Bergers* [fig. 7] look more bumptious, the scene less protected, the colours more robust, the hemline askew, the activities rather diverse, the trees more bow-legged than benedictional - the whole picture seems more coarse than the

dainty Lancret’s commemorating the darling opera prima donna of the day. Watteau’s *Les Bergers* lacks any fixed cultural referent, although it was very popular for aristocrats to hold masquerade parties in those days and also invite in a few real shepherds to liven up the amorous proceedings with a little real, coarse rambunctiousness.

The couple stage-center in *Les Bergers* is a happy couple. Whether their gallant gestures of her holding the dress ladylike and his jaunty curved hand is totally nonchalant and carefree, part of the jig, or mimicking gallantry ever so slightly, is not sure; but the bright colours, silken textures, festive blue shawl and flowers, plume in hat, bespeak frolic and decorus contact, with her pale flesh-coloured hand in his reddish one.

In the alcove to the back left is a get-acquainted stage for a couple, playing with swinging; the painting seems to leave it off to the side, in the background, as if it be a memory of what has preceded the central activity where the light swinging contact between man and woman has become public and more vigorous.

The bagpiper seated with crossed legs near a tree stump has a third couple nestling in close to him together; she leans in and tucks the fellow’s arm around her waist most cozily.

And almost unnoticed, hidden off to the right, is a black-caped shepherd of sheep, a good shepherd with a crook looking back over his shoulder, critical? wistful? both? while feeling left out? at least not partaking in the gaiety of *des plaisirs d’amour*. The black-caped shepherd betrays the painter’s melancholic presence, I think, and is a wry comment within the painting about the delights of love, a kind of Jacques’ penetration (in *As You Like It*) on the fleshly let-down that goes with courting amusements.66

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But Watteau’s students like Lancret, as well as Frederick the Great who bought more of Lancret’s paintings than he did of Watteau, dropped the bittersweet critical, questioning outsider’s note in their versions of what came to be catalogued as fetes galantes paintings. Therefore, Watteau’s historically important integration of mixed artistic topoi, which laicized and “demythologized” art, not only made painterly art popularly accessible to the leisure society driven by a rococo pursuit of delicate happiness, but also deepened painterly art by excising the literary pictorial referents common to Cesare Ripa and fashioned, if you will, paintings whose graphic reference was exercised more by painterly elements, a visual world of discourse. The historical follow-up, however, to Watteau’s deepening but secularizing artistic innovation was for artists to relax, miss the bittersweet note and rest in surface delights.

A cartographic art historian will also notice how the unreal Le concert champetre by Renaissance painter Giorgione (including Titian?), a utopia where music, idyllic beauty and reverie reign with perfect figures graced by lovely landscape decor, where an impeccably chaste distance rules the male fascination with erotic love, is a format which embraces Watteau’s rococo-spirited art. Watteau’s world is a park in late afternoon where amorous pilgrimages are made. There is never an occasion for marriage-bonds; Watteau’s perception remains largely confined to a day-dreaming, adolescent longing tenderness, and the polite intrigues of opera comique. If one can come to see Watteau’s painterly artworks historically, however, next to our brash exposure of Niagara Honeymoon No. 4 (1968) by the Canadian Denis Burton, or the ubiquitous Madonna and Sex, where, in concert with Foucault, “sexuality” is construed/constructed to be a repressive imposition: if one can read Watteau’s contribution, one might be able to grasp art historically a sense of something largely lost today, that a human caress needs not a commercialized but an imaginary dimension, even when its beguilement deserves to be unmasked by black or blue-caped strangers.

I have tried to present a glimpse of cartographic art historiography in action, against the expository backdrop of three basic categories: cultural period dynamic, typiconic format, and

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69 Cf. fig. 12, “Fetes Venitiennes,” and analysis in my article on “Telltale Statues in Watteau’s Paintings,” pp. 172-177.  
70 David Summers is right when he says: “Art history ... is an ongoing discussion about works of art by people who continually indicate and try to explain to others what they see either in works of art or series of them and what is significant about what they see. Such description, seriation, and explanation are by nature consensual and open to the works themselves.” In Critical Inquiry 15 (Winter 1989): 395. For significant examples of an art historian looking at artworks working with cartographic methodological categories, see the important
the once-only upon a time footprint trail.\textsuperscript{71} No art historiographic method is a guarantee of a correct reading. Every method must also fade into the background as you meet the concrete artworking reality alive, begin a get-acquainted looking/listening/ experiencing, and interpret. But art historiographic categories either prime, block, mislead, or enable receivers to taste artworks, which are indeed food for human imaginativity.\textsuperscript{72} The thrust of this presentation was to honour the Vollenhoven legacy for art history, and show that Vollenhoven gives wholesome bread rather than stones. This Vollenhoven centennial has also been a good occasion to put into practice Walter Benjamin’s principle that the historian is redemptive in redressing past injustices by memorializing them.\textsuperscript{73}

I picture the solitary Vollenhoven working late at 56 Koninginneweg under a glaring lightbulb in a cold house kitchen during the winter war years of Nazi occupation, sifting through the debris of preSocratic philosophical fragments and testimonia, patiently trying to bring historical philosophical order out of Diels-Kranz’ exhaustive labours. I know that when Vollenhoven’s researched results were published in 1950, the Dutch professional philosophical establishment’s reception was so hostile,\textsuperscript{74} it was a factor, I believe, in holding Vollenhoven’s booked work in Greek philosophy to “Deel I.” I should like my contribution today, along with the others, to remember with gratefulness the faithful historiographic dissertation by Dirk van den Berg, ‘\textit{N Ondersoek na die Estetiese en Kuns historiese Probleme Verbonde aan die sogenaamde Moderne Religieuse Skilderkuns}’ (Bloemfontein: Universiteit van die Oranje-Vrystaat, 1984), and, for example, Dirk van den Berg, “Coping with art historical diversity in methodological terms,” \textit{Acta Academica} 22 (No. 1, March 1990): 35-52. Also, fine professional explorative and interpretive work has been done in this modified Vollenhovian way by Gudrun F.T. Kuschke, \textit{The Representation of the Christian Ethos in the Poetry of Werner Bergengruen during the Third Reich Period}, diss. (Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand, 1981); and Suzanne de Villiers Human, “ Hogarth’s vitality,” in \textit{Suid Afrikaans Tydskrif Kuns-Arigtiekuurgeskiede} 2 (No. 2, 1991): 42-49; and James Leach, \textit{Instructive Ambiguities: Brecht and Muller’s Experiments with Lehnstucke} (Toronto: Institute for Christian Studies, M.Phil.F. thesis, November 1992).

\textsuperscript{71} If one wanted to track the history of painterly art, I find Lorenz Dittmann’s focus upon \textit{Farbgestaltung} promising, because Dittmann takes this nub of painterly art-colour-as the relevant footprint trail to describe. Cf. \textit{Farbgestaltung and Farbtheorie in der Abend-ldndischen Malerei}, Eine Einführung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1987).

\textsuperscript{72} Whether cartographic categories and a Vollenhovian method in general are not overly “determinative,” and do they really allow an interpreter to engage “the other” historically, to listen and understand what is “foreign” to the historian, as Prof. Henk Geertsema asked during the question forum of the centennial celebration, is a fair question to ask of any historiographic method, of one that self-consciously knows its mind and of ones that are less self aware. (Cf. my comment on pedagogical strength and danger, above pp.62-63, and my article in the Taljaard Festschrift, “The pedagogical strength of christian methodology in philosophical historiography,” \textit{Koers} 40 (Nos. 4-6, 1975): 269-313. Openness to what is strange, care for what is human, and the timing of one’s judgment are probably crucial in the matter of whether one’s diagnosis of the neighbour’s face identifies its lineaments well or disfigures the profile.

\textsuperscript{73} Walter Benjamin, \textit{Theses teber Geschichte}, II, III, VI, XV, A, B.

theoretical struggles which led Vollenhoven to enunciate the Scripturally directed principles lie
learned and practised in those solitary labours with his *Inleiding en Geschiedenis der Griekse
Wijsbegeerte voor Platoon en Aristoteles*. One commemorates best, perhaps, by carrying on
reformingly the earlier service rendered.

If there be any sceptics on the Christian community’s need to know what one’s
historiographic methodology is, a few lines from Bertolt Brecht’s poem “An die
Nachgeborenen” might be appropriate:

...Ihr, die ihr auftauchen werdet aus der Flut In der wir
untergegangen sind, Gedenkt
Wenn ihr von unsern Schwachen spricht Auch der finsteren Zeit
Der ihr entronnen seid.

...Dabei wissen wir ja:
Auch der Hass gegen die Niedrigkeit Verzerrt die Zuge.
Auch der Zorn fiber das Unrecht
Macht die Stimme heiser. Ach, wir
Die wir den Boden bereiten wollten fur Freundlichkeit Konnten selber nicht freundlich
sein.

Ihr aber, wenn es so weit sein wird
Dass der Mensch dem Mensch ein Helfer ist, Gedenkt unsrer
Mit Nachsicht....

And for all the faithful who mean to persist in doing justice by keeping history with integrity, the
final word of shalom is this: to be a reliable historian, with a thickened,\(^{75}\) charitable, fine-
tuned remembrance, is possibly one of the highest reflective callings today, showing love to
one’s disoriented neighbours,\(^{76}\) if you indeed do justice to your faith forebears by bringing their

\(^{75}\) Cf. chapter 11, “The Thick Autonomy of Memory,” in Edward Casey, *Remembering, a phenomenological

\(^{76}\) John Calvin’s judgment, in an age of unruly partisan wars, that to he a civil magistrate (circuit judge) to
administer God’s merciful justice without respect of persons is *vocatio... non modo coram Deo sancta et
legitima, sed sacerrima etiam, et in tota mortalium vita longe omnium honestissima* (Institutes of the
Christian Religion IV,20,iv) deserves, in our day of overpowering media and hyper-reality, dominated by
labours to life again, keeping your promise to those who gave us life, also in philosophy, and so walk humbly with our covenant God (Micah 6:8).

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/courses/rschwart/pastoral/thm_Watteau_Shepherds.jpg

fig 7

a pragmatistic mentalite turned only to future success, the complement of recognizing that historians who selflessly bear true witness in these “last days” to the deeds of others are at the crux of providing leadership.